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UNIAWFUL ARREST RESULTING IN INCRIMINATING 
STATEMENT - ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION 
Regina v. SPENCE - Manitoba Court of Appeal 
41 CCC (3d) 354 
Four off-shift police officers were out on the town . Shortly after l eaving a 
bar a bottle was thrown at their car. The driver stopped and gave chase 
followed by his fellow officers. They ended up in a hostile crowd among which 
were members of a youth gang. The officers received a beating from about 30 
persons. The police department made an effort to round up the assailants and 
pictures of suspects were shown to patrol officers. Two officers spotted the 
accused and a male companion in the area where the assaults took place. They 
resembled those in the pictures and the accused wore a leather jacket similar 
to those worn by the youth gang members. The young men were approached and 
asked for identification. The accused's companion had a departmental badge in 
his possession and both were on that basis arrested for possession of stolen 
property and given the usual warnings. 
After 2 1/2 hours of custody the accused's companion told police that Spence 
(the accused) was involved in the assault on the officers. The accused was 
then re-arrested for aggravated assault and again given his rights. When told 
what his friend had said the accused confessed that he had been involved but 
had "only hit the guy a couple of times". This was the evidence the Crown had 
against the accused . 
The trial judge held that the original arrest was unlawful as the officers had 
no reasonable and probable grounds that the accused was in possession of the 
badge his friend had on his person. His arrest was an arbitrary one. Despite 
this Charter right infringement the confession was admitted as it would not 
bring disrepute on the administration of justice to do so. A conviction 
followed and the accused appealed to the Manitoba Court of Appeal. 
The trial judge as well as the Court of Appeal did not debate or spend too 
much time on the issue of voluntariness. What was alluded to was the common 
law rule about a statement that came as the consequence of an inducement or 
threat and a subsequent statement made while the inducement or threat leading 
up to the first one had not been removed. Needless to say both statements 
would be involuntary. The Court of Appeal compared the connection between the 
improprieties and the second statement to the link between an infringement of 
a right and a statement subsequently made. The Court of Appeal pointed out 
that even when there is no link between a Charter right infringement and the 
obtaining of evidence, the evidence may be excluded. Where there is a link it 
is simply more likely that admitting the evidence would bring disrepute on the 
administration of justice. 
The trial judge and one of the three Court of Appeal Justices felt that the 
statement should be admitted despite the unlawful arrest and the arbitrary 
detention. The arrest and detention had not been used to elicit the 
confession. Furthermore, the incident and the charge were serious. The 
remedy of exclusion is totally disproportioned with the gravity of the charge 
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and is more likely to bring disrepute on the administration of justice than 
admitting the evidence despite the infringement, said the dissenting Justice 
of the Court of Appeal. 
However, the majority judgement was that any substantial arbitrary detention 
is too long. There was absolutely no foundation to the first arrest and it 
was a flagrant improper exercise of police power which resulted in a 2 1/2 
hour detention before there was a proper and well founded second arrest. The 
confession was inevitably affected by the detention. The accused's 
willingness to incriminate himself when he was finally properly arrested, was 
linked to the infringement of his rights not to be so detained. Admitting the 
confession, (the only evidence against the accused), would indeed bring 
disrepute on the administration of justice held the Court of Appeal. 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Acquittal to substitute conviction 
* * * * * 
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CABINET SOLIDARITY - CABINET - POLITICS AND PROSECUTORIAL SERVICES 
Re: The Queen and ROYAL COHHISSION INTO THE DONALD HARSHALL JR. PROSECUTION 
Re: HARSHALL and HICXHAN et al. 42 CCC (3d) 129. 
Donald Marshall was convicted of murder in Nova Scotia. It was later found 
that Marshall was not guilty and it became apparent that improprieties had 
influenced the investigating and prosecutorial stages of this case. The 
executive branch (the cabinet) of the province ordered a public inquiry. 
However, when the Commission appointed for this purpose subpoenaed the serving 
and previous Attorneys General to question them on the consideration given to 
public prosecutions, they claimed executive immunity. 
The Cabinet, the Privy Council, or by whatever name you want to call the 
premier and his ministers of the Crown, have since time immemorial enjoyed 
the privilege of executive solidarity. They are always "apparently" 
unanimous; no one, other than at his/her political peril, can break ranks . 
Their discussions are for the public good, not to be disclosed. 
When the present and past Attorneys General were questioned by the Commission 
they claimed executive privilege. The Commission made them aware that it was 
the Cabinet that established the inquiry, and it must therefore be assumed 
that it, within reason, waived the immunity. By means of extra ordinary 
remedies, this issue was taken to the Nova Scotia's Queen's Bench. Two 
applications were heard simultaneously. Cabinet applied that no questions be 
allowed of the subpoenaed ministers on the views of and discussions with other 
ministers during Cabinet meetings. Marshall applied for the Court to remove 
the restrictions the commission had placed on his scope of examining the 
ministers. The commission had not allowed questions that would reveal the 
identity of ministers or their contributions to discussions in Cabinet 
meetings. In answer to the Cabinet's position the commission had reasoned 
that if the privilege of cabinet not to disclose even its general discussions, 
is for the public interest, then it is not absolute as the public interest is 
paramount in the inquiry. Where it is in the public interest to reveal those 
discussions or docwnents the immunity cannot be afforded. 
One cabinet minister testified how meetings are conducted. No minutes are 
kept and it is not recorded who is present. The decisions are Orders in 
Council and are public docwnents. The meetings are in camera to ensure that 
there can be a frank and open discussion without fear of expressed views being 
misinterpreted. When a decision is reached by majority, even those who 
dissented, support it publicly. This and other aspects of the privilege of 
immunity is known as the doctrine of "Joint Cabinet Responsibility." 
It has also been recognized by the same conventions and common law, that 
executive council positions are somewhat aloof of the political turmoil. 
Their functions are separated from that of the council as a whole. These 
the Attorney General (Minister of Justice) and the Speaker of the House. 
aspects of their specific office are semi judicial and their personal 
responsibility. For instance should the Attorney General personally have to 
two 
are 
Many 
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decide whether or not someone is to be prosecuted he/she makes that decision 
as part of the office rather than as a member of the Executive Council. After 
all, a politically motivated prosecution is hardly desireable and a 
contradiction of the apparent objectives of politics and justice. 
One previous Attorney General who is now the Chief Judge of the Provincial 
Court, appeared before the Commission. He clearly indicated that in terms of 
providing prosecutorial services, he did not consider himself to be part of 
the Cabinet and not subject to Cabinet directions or solidarity. Should his 
Cabinet colleagues decide to discuss a prosecution, he would have left the 
meeting. 
In view of the fact that both parties proceed by means of an extraordinary 
remedy, the Queen's Bench was acting in a supervisory capacity rather than to 
review judicial decisions (appeal) by the Commission. In other words it had 
to decide whether in law it was right for the commission to restrict the 
questioning to discovery of "what" decision the Cabinet made rather than "why" 
it did so decide. The Justice of Queen's Bench quoted that non-disclosure in 
these circumstances is not a "Crown privilege" but a "public interest 
immunity". Not all discussions are worthy of that immunity and it also 
expires with time. 
In view of the Commission's mandate to develop meaningful recommendations to 
ensure an appropriate role of the Attorney General and an equitable Justice 
system to ensure that "the unfortunate events surrounding Mr. Marshall" will 
not be repeated it (the Commission) had not committed an error in law. With 
that the Attorney General's application was dismissed. 
In relation to Mr. Marshall's application the Court observed that there was no 
evidence that any discussion had taken place in Cabinet about Marshall's 
prosecution. The Attorney General of that day denied to ever having discussed 
any prosecution matter in Cabinet. Therefore Mr. marshall ' s application could 
not be considered as the issue was one of conjecture. 
* * * * * 
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KURDER. - RIGHT TO COUNCIL - ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENT 
VALIDITY OF AUTHORIZATION TO INTERCEPT - OPENING "JACKET• 
Regina v. PLAYFORD 40 CCC (3d) 142 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The Crown adduced evidence before a jury that the accused had been involved in 
credit card fraud together with a W. The accused had anticipated a 5 year 
jail sentence should he be convicted. W. confessed to the fraud and was 
expected to testify for the Crown. The accused then told W. that he knew of a 
buried drug cache and agreed to help dig it up and sell the drugs. W. dug the 
hole that became his grave. The accused allegedly killed him during the 
digging. W.'s body was never found. 
The accused related this sordid event to a police informer. This resulted in 
police obtaining judicial authorization to intercept the accused's 
conununications. Bugs were placed in his car and home and the informer had the 
accused repeat the circumstances of W.'s murder. The enticement to get the 
accused to talk about the murder was concocted between the informer (who by 
now was actually an agent) and police. He proposed a scheme of offering to 
sell drugs to undercover agents. Instead of making the sale they would attend 
at the rendez-vous, murder the agents and take the funds they would have on 
them to complete the transaction. It was thought that this proposal would 
make the accused talk of his experience in killing W. This was successful. 
To prove its case, the Crown relied on evidence of W's family that he had 
disappeared; on the informer evidence of the accused relating to him the 
details of the killing; the intercepted communications which corroborated 
this; and the accused's inculpatory utterance to the officer in charge of the 
investigation. All of this resulted in a conviction of first degree murder 
which the accused appealed. 
Some of the issues which became grounds of appeal centered on the 
interceptions and the admissibility of the incriminating statement the accused 
had made. 
The accused had been arrested on a Sunday evening at 7:30. He was properly 
informed of the reason for the arrest (the murder of W.), was told of his 
right to counsel and the right to remain silent. Upon request he had been 
given the use of a telephone. Instead of a lawyer he had phoned a friend. A 
policeman was within earshot and made notes of the accused's part of the 
conversation. At 9:30 on Monday morning he again was given a telephone to use 
upon his request. He, unbeknown to the officer within hearing, spoke with 
the lawyer's secretary. He promised her not to say anything until he had 
spoken to the lawyer. The officer made notes of this conversation. After 
this call he was put back in cells where the Inspector in charge of the 
detective division approached the accused and asked him to do something decent 
for W.'s family by telling where the body was, so they could at least give him 
a proper burial. The accused had in response made an attempt to bargain and 
more than implied that if they reduced the murder charge to one of second 
degree, he would do as the Inspector requested. The officer countered, "No 
way. Maybe we won't do you for habitual." This, of course, was inculpatory 
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and leads one to infer that the accused knew where the body could be found. 
The infringement of the accused's right to counsel should have resulted in the 
exclusion of this evidence at trial argued the defence. 
The defence summed up from law and precedents that a detained person : 
1. . .. must be made aware of his rights to counsel ... 
2. . .. must understand that right ... 
3. . .. must be given a reasonable opportunity to exercise that right . .. 
4. . .. must not be questioned or be asked to supply evidence until he 
has been given the opportunity to consult counsel ... 
5. . .. must (included in 3 and 4 above) be given privacy to so consult 
counsel ... 
6. . .. cannot be considered to have waived that right to counsel by 
silence on that point or by not opposing answering questions but 
only by means of expressly waiving it. 
It was submitted that only 1, 2 and 3 were complied with by the investigators 
and that all the other requisites had been ignored. The defence relied on the 
Manninenl case decided in 1987 by the Supreme Court of Canada. The trial 
judge had rejected the defence arguments on the following grounds: 
1. Manninen had indicated (with explicit obscenities) that he did not 
want to say anything; the accused in this case did not. 
2. Manninen had not been supplied with a telephone; the accused was on 
two occasions. 
3. Just before making his statement to the Inspector the accused was 
advised by the lawyer's secretary not to say anything until he had 
consulted a lawyer, and as such, had received legal advice which 
Maninnen did not; 
4. In regards to privacy, the accused should have complained that he 
had no privacy when he made his second call - the first call to the 
friend had nothing to do with obtaining counsel. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal observed that all cases on this point indicate 
that privacy is inherent in the right to counsel and a request for privacy by 
the accused is not essential. The trial judge had also been wrong about the 
first call to the friend not being one that should receive the same 
consideration as the call to the lawyer. The Court concluded that the 
accused's right to counsel had been infringed and in the absence of the 
accused having waived his right to counsel this infringement could cause the 
statement to be inadmissible. The Crown argued that by reacting to the 
Inspector's question the accused had waived that right and only voluntariness 
needed to be considered for admission of the evidence . 
1 R. v. HANNINEN 34 C.C.C . (3d) 385. See Volume 28, page 1 of this 
publication 
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The Ontario Court of Appeal observed that the question of waiver only arises 
when a detained person has not had a reasonable opportunity to consult 
counsel. When that opportunity has been afforded: 
" .... the police are entitled to question an accused 
without asking for his consent .... " 
In this case no such opportunity was afforded the accused and the Court found 
that the Crown had failed to show that the accused had waived his right . This 
meant that the exclusion of the statement hinged on whether admission could 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Assessing the law and circumstances surrounding the statement the Court of 
Appeal observed the following:2 
1. The Inspector had put a baiting and accusatory question to the 
accused; a trial question. 
2. The question was in relation to the most serious charge in the 
Criminal Code of Canada. 
3. The question was not one of urgency and did not directly produce 
real evidence. 
4. The answer the accused gave was one of considerable probative value 
in that it could lead to the inference not only that W. was murdered 
but that the accused committed the murder. The answer was one no 
innocent person would have reason to give. 
The Court concluded that admitting the answer the accused gave to the 
Inspector's question would render the trial unfair and bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. Consequently it was inadmissible. 
The exclusion of this statement was not necessarily fatal to the Crown's case. 
However, if the intercepted communication would also be excluded all the Crown 
would have left is the informer's evidence of what the accused told him and 
evidence of a man (W.) who disappeared some seven years ago. Hardly 
sufficient to support a conviction. 
It seems that if the Police would have, for instance, put a body-pack on the 
informer and had intercepted the communications that way no judicial 
authorization would have been needed. 3 The consent of the informer to 
intercept would have sufficed. However, instead police planted bugs in the 
2 See COLLINS v. The Queen - Volume 27, page 1 of this publication. 
3 See Regina v. WIGGINS - Volume 30, page 15 of the publication 
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home and places the accused resorted to. This required breaking into those 
places and without the authorization police had no power to do so.4 Defence 
counsel alleged that the authorization was invalid and reasoned that 
consequently the interception of the communication in the places where police 
had to break in to plant the bugs were inadmissible. In addition, the manner 
in which the place was bugged caused use of electrical power belonging to the 
telephone company. Regardless how "infinitesimal" the value (eleven cents) it 
was unlawful and not implicitly included in the authorization. 
To challenge the validity of the authorization the defence had requested the 
trial judge "to look behind" it. He suggested opening the packet, alleging 
that the applicant had not revealed that bugs had already been installed other 
than in the home and that the informer had already given his consent to the 
interceptions. Neither was there any mention that firearms were involved in 
the scheme, claimed the defence. The trial judge had ruled that the defence 
must make out a prima facie case of fraud, nondisclosure and or deliberate 
misleading of the authorizing judge before the packet can be opened. However , 
the trial judge did allow the affiant to be cross-examined to see if there 
was such a case. Despite a hazy memory on the part of the affiant the trial 
judge held that there was no intent to mislead and no substantial 
nondisclosure on the part of the police. He held the authorization was valid 
and the evidence admissible. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal also disagreed with that ruling. It held that 
when an investigation is completed, then to determine if the search for and 
.seizure of evidence resulting from intercepted private communications is not 
an infringement of the right not to be subjected to unreasonable search or 
seizure, an accused person is entitled to know the content of the 
affidavit/application (except, of course, the identity of informers). A 
cross-examination of an affiant without having the content of the document the 
content of which is the very subject of that examination is farcical. Not 
disclosing the content is a deprivation of the principles of fundamental 
justice resulting in an unfair trial. 
Note : 
Accused's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
In British Columbia the courts, by precedent, use the same 
approach as the Ontario trial judge did, to determine 
justification for opening the packet. See Volume 28 page 
4 of this publication. 
***** 
4 Constitutional reference to Supreme Court of Canada - Volume 20, 
page 13 of this publication 
- 9 -
ARBITRARY DETENTION BY MEANS OF POLICY ARREST 
FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT - EXCWSION OF VOUJNTARY STATEMENT 
Regina v. CHARBONNEAU - County Court of Prince Rupert -
Smithers, BC 6844 - April 1988. 
Police investigated a sexual assault complaint and had reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that the accused was the perpetrator. An arrest was 
effected as a matter of policy and in furtherance of the investigation so 
that there would be the opportunity to interrogate the accused. Not until 
the investigating officer had completed his investigation did he deal with the 
matter of the accused's release from custody. The predominant aspect of the 
investigation during the period of detention was the taking of a statement and 
the admissibility of that evidence became subject to a voir dire. Defence 
counsel moved that the statement which was ruled to be voluntarily given, be 
suppressed under S. 24(2) of the Charter as it was obtained in a manner that 
infringed the accused's right not to be arbitrarily arrested and detained. 
The offence of sexual assault is hybrid, as it is an'indictable offence that 
may be also prosecuted by means of summary conviction. It does consequently 
belong to the category of offences where a peace officer shall not effect an 
arrest unless he believes on reasonable and probably grounds that the public 
interest justifies the arrest (s. 495(2) 1989 CC). 
The County Court trial judge held that an arrest can be arbitrary if effected 
to accommodate further investigation. He also concluded that a lawful arrest 
is capable of being arbitrary. This as the section quoted above, stipulates 
that where a peace officer does effect an arrest on reasonable and probable 
grounds that a person has committed an indictable offence where he should not 
have done so due to the •public interest" being satisfied, the arrest is still 
lawful in any proceedings under the Criminal Code or other federal statutes. 
In other words in terms of arrest without warrant, lawfulness and 
arbitrariness do not equate. 
Then, after reviewing a number of cases on this point, the trial judge 
concluded: 
" .... that the arrest and detention was not only not for 
the purpose set out in section 450(2), but it was for 
either of the purposes which have been found by other 
courts to constitute an arbitrary arrest and detention." 
He consequently found that the accused's right not to be arbitrarily detained 
had been infringed. The "either of the purposes" for the arrest are, one 
assumes, compliance with implied or expressed arrest policy or to accommodate 
the investigation. 
Everything had been done according to the book and no criticism could be 
levied. The accused was made aware of his rights to counsel and did have a 
lawyer advise him at the police station prior to making any statements. 
Subsequent to whatever good or bad advice he received from his lawyer the 
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accused made a conscious and informed decision to give police a totally 
voluntary statement. Could accepting this statement in evidence, bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute? Considering the flawless police 
procedure, other than the arbitrariness of the arrest, the trial judge found 
that admitting the statement could and would not bring disrepute on the 
administration of justice. 
Statement by accused admitted 
into evidence 
Comment: One thing that seems not to be considered in these reasons for 
judgement is if wanting to further investigate, is included in one 
of the exemptions to the "shall not arrest" (s. 450(2) C.C. or 495 
(2) C.C. in 1989 C.C.). A suspect's statement in relation to an 
offence is very weighty in evidence and may be adduced by the Crown 
not only to prove that the statement was made by an accused but more 
importantly, to prove the truth of it's content. Consequently, if 
there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a person 
has committed an offence securing and preserving such evidence is in 
the public interest. Subsection (2) of the section~ awkwardly 
worded. It takes a little mental gymnastics to capture it's meaning 
the first time one reads it. However, if one considers the kernel 
aspect of the section, it seems to emphasize something, establish a 
priority; or place the intent of the lawmaker into proper 
perspective. 
In 1970 there was a quantum change imposed on police arrest 
routines. Too many people were unnecessarily in custody in between 
arrest and first appearance in Court. It is not totally unfair to 
say that that routine was based more on the legality of the arrest 
and custody than on the need for it. Sometimes the arrest and 
period preceding the first court appearance were apparently part of 
the penalty for allegedly having committed an offence. Bail 
procedures were favouring the sophisticated and the economically 
blessed suspects only. 
Those who did not belong in either category simply stayed in the 
holding units. All the enactments now contained in our Criminal 
Code that limit and guide the powers of arrest and force continuous 
scrutiny of the justification for continuing the custody of an 
arrested person and all the provisions for police to release such 
persons, came into effect in 1970. The package was usually referred 
to as the Bail Reform Act. Subsection (2) of s. 450 C.C. was 
obviously to lessen the number of routine or policy arrests for 
offences on the lower end of the scale in terms of gravity. The 
hybrid offence of sexual assault is one of them. Mind you sexual 
assault can be the unconsented touching of another person that 
offends the sexual integrity of that person to what was known as 
rape. Such broad coverage is a characteristic of a hybrid offence; 
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the very reason for classifying the offence as one that may be tried 
upon the accused's election by a superior court with a jury to a 
mere prosecution upon sununary conviction. Needless to say that 
when Parliament wanted to restrict the unnecessary custody of 
suspects it had to be very careful how much of the medicine to 
administer to the patient. Too much could cause paralysis. The 
Court did not consider if the taking of a statement in the 
circumstances of this case, "TO SECURE EVIDENCE" is included in "the 
public interest" definition. On the surface this provision seems to 
fit the circumstances and be capable of rendering the arrest to be 
justified. However, there are opinions that the words "to secure or 
preserve evidence" do not provide alternative aspects of "public 
interest" but must be read together. These words in conjunction 
with the other provisions in the definition, imply that the reason 
for arresting despite the "shall not", must be a matter of urgency. 
You either arrest or it is probable that there will be a 
continuation of the offence; the commission of another offence; the 
suspect cannot be identified and consequently proceedings cannot be 
commenced; the suspect will abscond; etc. The collective tenor of 
these provisions imply -- arrest or else. In other words, in these 
circumstances the public interest supersedes what Parliament 
attempted to remedy by this legislation. Applying the "urgency" 
test one may infer that the part of the definition dealing with 
evidence dictates to only arrest where otherwise evidence will 
probably be lost, destroyed or simply not obtainable. In this 
Charbonneau case police had as much authority to speak to the 
accused without the arrest as they did with it. The accused had 
regardless of the arrest the right to remain silent. As already 
pointed out, the evidence obtained was not real, .but a statement. 
***** 
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WAT IS THE CROWH OBLIGED m PROVE 
FOil A CONVICTION OF REFUSING 1'0 GIVE A SAMPLE OF BLOOD 
Regina v. I1ARTIN - County Court of Vancouver -
No. GG870101 
The accused was involved in an accident and ended up in the hospital 
emergency ward where a demand was made of him to allow a sample of blood to be 
taken for the purpose of analysis. Everything had been done properly and 
there was proof that the accused refused to allow blood being taken other than 
for medical purposes. He was convicted in Provincial Court and appealed the 
verdict. 
The section providing for the demand and stipulating the conditions under 
which the sample can be taken, states that only a qualified medical 
practitioner (who is satisfied that taking the blood does not endanger the 
health or life of the suspect) can do so. Defence Counsel submitted that the 
Grown must not only prove that there was such a practitioner available but 
also that he was of the opinion that taking the blood would not be adverse to 
the health of the suspect . These are essential elements of the offence of 
refusing to give such a sample and the onus is on the Grown to prove them. 
The County Court rejected the argument and held that if the accused had not 
refused the Grown would have had to prove that these essential conditions 
existed to have the analysis admitted in evidence. If this was not so then, 
nearly all convictions of refusing to give a breath sample would be improper. 
The offence of refusing is complete when the suspect does refuse ... period. 
The Crown need not prove that there was in fact an approved breathalyzer and a 
certified operator available at the time. All these matters come into play 
when the sample is given, analyzed and the results are adduced for acceptance 
and proof. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
* * * * * 
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BODY SEARCH INCONSISTENT WITH 
REASON FOR ARREST - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v_ GREFFE - 41 C.C.C. (3d) 257 
Alberta Court of Appeal 
Police had reasonable and probably grounds for believing that the accused 
arriving on a direct flight from Amsterdam, was importing heroin. Police and 
Custom officers took charge of him at the Calgary airport but could not find 
anything on the accused or in his baggage. The police officers' evidence had 
been conflicting on this point, but the trial judge concluded as a fact that 
the accused was arrested for outstanding traffic warrants. He was not told of 
his right to counsel and was taken to a hospital where a doctor found two 
condoms containing heroin in his rectal canal, approaching $225,000.00 in 
street value. The accused was acquitted as all evidence was suppressed for 
the following reasons; the arrest had been invalid due to it being "a 
convenient artifice"; a search of the rectum when arrested for outstanding 
traffic offences is unreasonable; and his right to counsel had been infringed 
as he was not told of that right. The Crown appealed the acquittal. 
One of the three Court of Appeal Justices found that the officers' activities 
had amounted to the epitome of bad faith. They had been deliberate, and 
flagrant in the way they investigated this case without regard for the 
accused's rights. He considered the violations serious and would dismiss the 
Crown's appeal. His two colleagues agreed that the rights of the accused had 
been infringed but held that the breaches by police "pale" when compared to 
the accused's duplicity and deception when he attempted to gain entry into 
Canada posing as a routine traveller while in fact he was a narcotics courier . 
The Court commented that those in the heroin trade seldom use the customs and 
immigration stations at our airports as confessionals. Considering all L 
circumstances, and comparing the flawed police actions with the criminal I 
purpose of the accused, a reasonable man would not consider it disreputable I 
for the Court to admit the evidence that was found as a consequence of those 
flaws. Here is how the Alberta Court of Appeal reasoned in relation to each 
ground for appeal. 
The accused had the right to be informed of the reason for his arrest. Police 
did undoubtedly use the outstanding traffic matters as a camouflage for the 
real reason for the arrest. Section 10 of the Charter is concerned "with the 
right of the subject to be given the information and opportunity to seek 
judicial interim release from detention." rather than a legal right to defer 
and delay lawful investigation and reasonable searches. The Court reasoned 
that drug enforcement is difficult and those who carry out the drug trade have 
a tremendous negative influence on society. The accused knew he was a courier 
and police had sufficient grounds to believe he was on this occasion carrying 
contraband. The arrest, though not for a narcotic or drug offence, was valid. 
With the heroin being secreted where it was, the accused was very much aware 
"of the realities of his detention and coming search" well before it took 
place. The Alberta Court of Appeal accepted the reasoning of its Ontario 
counterpart in 19865 when it, backed by three Supreme Court of Canada 
5 R. v. DEBOK 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207 
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rulings6, held that reasonable on-the-spot drug searches resulting from 
reasonable and probable grounds that a person has illegal drugs in his 
possession do not become unreasonable or even legally vulnerable, because the 
person searched was not told of the reason for the detention (s. lO(a) 
Charter). 
The manner of the search of Greffe had also been reasonable. An experienced 
surgeon carried it out. The Supreme Court of Canada said in the Collins case 
in 1987 that a search authorized by law is reasonable only if that law itself 
is reasonable and the search is carried out reasonably. The Court recognized 
that there is hardly a greater intrusion imaginable than a search of the 
rectum and reminded itself that Greffe did not consent to the search but did 
not object to or resist it. The Court reasoned, however, that the accused had 
profaned his own bodily integrity by secreting the drugs in his lower bowels. 
Furthermore, there had been a strategy behind all of this. Greffe had placed 
the heroin where it was, so nothing could be found if a normal search would 
take place. Now he claims that because the nature of the search, needed to 
locate the contraband, was repulsive, he provided himself with a defence. The 
Alberta Court of Appeal concluded: 
"To me there is little sense in the invalidation of a 
lawful arrest by the failure to repeat to an accused what 
he demonstrably knows and has taken steps to disguise . " 
The arrest was valid, and the search was reasonable in terms of the law and 
the way it was carried out. 
One objection to the search by defence counsel was interesting. It was 
reasoned that if the arrest was valid and if the police had knowledge that 
Greffe was importing drugs, then human regularity being what it is the 
evidence would eventually have emerged. The search was unnecessary and so 
were the discomforts it caused the accused. The Court responded that the 
argument ignored that police were unaware of the quantity, did not know where 
precisely in the canal the heroin was located and if it was sufficiently 
protected against dissemination if left to come out naturally. 
Crown's appeal allowed; conviction 
ordered; referred back to the trial 
court for sentencing 
* * * * * 
6 COLLINS v. The Queen 33 C.C . C. (3d), Volume 27, page 1 of this 
publication 
POHORETSKY v. The Queen 33 G.G . C. (3d) 398 . 
R. v. TREMBLAY 37 G. G.G. (3d) 565 . 
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DOCTRINE OF RECENT POSSESSION? 
KOWLYK v. The Queen - Supreme Court of Canada --
September 1988 
Kowlyk and his brother kept an eye on the obituaries and assumed that the 
family home of a deceased person would be unattended during the funeral 
services. They successfully burglared three homes of bereaved families. 
Subsequently, the accused's brother was arrested for an unrelated theft and he 
confessed to the three burglaries. He took police to the place he shared with 
the accused and upon entering the house shouted: "Wake up Ray. The Police 
are here. They got us. It is all over." Seventy-six items from those homes 
were in the accused's secured bedroom. The accused did not at the time of 
his arrest or by means of personal testimony at his trial give an explanation 
of how he came to be in the possession of the recently stolen property. All 
he said was: "All you got me for is possession. I'm not saying anything." 
Without any direct evidence that the accused was involved in the burglaries he 
was convicted of three counts of break, enter and theft. The convictions were 
exclusively based on the application of the doctrine of recent possession. 
This, the accused argued, was inappropriate and he unsuccessfully appealed the 
convictions to the Manitoba Court of Appeal . 7 
What is somewhat surprising is that the only ground for appeal was the 
question of propriety to convict a person of the crime by means of which the 
property, found in his possession, was taken from the owner. Although the 
Court did touch on the question of the doctrine of recent possession offending 
the Charter right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the anticipated 
emphasis on that point did fizzle out. 
The common law doctrine of recent possession provides that a person who is 
found in possession of property obtained by means of an indictable offence, 
that he fails to explain contemporaneously to being found in possession of 
those goods or through personal testimony, may presume to have the guilty 
knowledge requisite to the offence of possessing stolen goods or may presume 
to have committed the crime by means of which the owner was deprived of the 
property. 
The theory was born in 1830 when a party was found to have a horse in his 
possession that had been stolen three days previously. In 1836, the aspect of 
"recency" was added to the unexplained possession as a requisite for the 
possessor to be convicted of the theft. It was refined in 1864 in the well 
known Longmead case. He was charged with not only stealing a number of sheep, 
but also "receiving" (as it was then called) the stolen animals. The highest 
English courts ruled that it was not excessive to presume from the unexplained 
recent possession that Longmead had committed either one of the two offences 
alleged, whichever one better suited the circumstances. 
7 Volume 25, page 28 of this publication. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that labelling "recent possession" a 
"doctrine" or "principle" is excessive. It also reasoned that it is not a 
"presumption" or "reversed onus" either. The majority of the court called it 
a "rule of evidence" instead of a doctrine. A doctrine teaches something and 
the common law application of "recent possession" teaches nothing. 
Furthermore, this rule of evidence does not allow anything to be presumed but 
simply provides for an inference that ~ be drawn by the trier of fact from 
certain proof. It is not a reversed onus either as the burden of proof 
remains with the prosecution and does not shift at any time to the accused 
person. The "rule of evidence" provides that a person who is found in 
possession of property recently obtained by the commission of an indictable 
offence and fails to give a reasonable explanation at the time, or fails to so 
explain by means of his own testimony, the trier of fact may infer that the 
possessor knew that the goods had been so obtained or that he did commit the 
indictable offence by means of which the goods were obtained. It was 
emphasized that the explanation or personal testimony must be capable of 
belief. In other words reasonableness is believability. When an explanation 
is rejected as unbelievable then there is no explanation. This means that a 
jury needs not to be convinced that the explanation is true before they can 
accept it . Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the trier of fact may (not 
must) draw the inferences. 
The jury must, by considering the proof of unexplained recent possession be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt. Consequently, 
the Charter right to be presumed innocent is not offended by this rule of 
evidence. 
In summary the Supreme Court of Canada said: 
" .... it is my view, .... that what has been called the 
doctrine of recent possession may be succinctly 
stated in the following terms. Upon proof of. an 
unexplained possession of recently stolen property, 
the trier of fact may - but not must - draw an 
inference of guilt of theft or of offences 
incidental thereto. Where the circumstances are 
such that a question could arise as to whether the 
accused was a thief or merely a possessor, it will 
be for the trier of fact upon consideration of all 
the circumstances to decide which, if either, 
inference should be drawn. In all recent 
possession cases the inference of guilt is 
permissive, not mandatory, and when an explanation 
is offered which might reasonably be true, even 
though the trier of fact is not satisfied of its 
truth, the doctrine will not apply." 
Appeal dismissed 
Convictions upheld 
***** 
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ARBITRARY .ARREST IDR. AFFECIIlfG 
ADKISSABILITY OF STATEMENT 
Regina v. CHARBONNE~!J - County Court of Prince Rupert 
Smithers, BC 68444 - April 1988 
The accused was arrested for "sexual assault" and given all his rights, 
including the right to remain silent. Subsequent to his arrest, the accused 
made a perfectly voluntary statement the Crown adduced in evidence at the 
trial. Defence Counsel argued that the statement must be suppressedd due to 
the accused's right not to be arbitrarly arrested or detained had been 
infringed. He submitted that the arrest was only effected to comply with 
departmental policy and that there had been no consideration to release the 
accused until, in their view, the officers had completed the investigation. 
The Court found that none of the public interest issues summed up in s. 450 
(2) C.C. (s. 495 under the new numbering) existed at the time the arrest was 
effected and all during the investigation of this alleged hybrid offence. 
This defence counsel argued that the arrest and subsequent custody was 
arbitrary and an infringement of the accused's Charter right not to be so 
arrested or detained. Needless to say, this submission was made to have the 
voluntary statement by the accused excluded from the Crown's evidence. 
In answer to all the evidence adduced during the voir dire on this issue the 
Court found that an arrest or detention for the purpose of enhancing or 
accommodating an investigation is capable of being arbitrary for that reason 
alone. The cases now reported on this issue are going from a strict 
conclusion that a lawful arrest contrary to s. 450(2) C.C. is an infringment 
of the Charter right mentioned above and that all evidence subsequently or 
consequently obtained must be excluded, to findings that such a lawful 
detention does not necessarily call for exclusion as long as it was not 
despotic or capricious. 
The County Court Judge emphasized that a lawful arrest is very much capable of 
being an arbitrary arrest. In section 450(2) C.C. it clearly states that 
where an arrest is effected in spite of the "shall not," unless the public 
interest is not satisfied, it is still a lawful arrest for any purpose under 
the Criminal Code. However this Court held that there is no equasion between 
the two.a It reasoned that by the same token an arrest could be unlawful and 
still not be artibrary. 
The arrest in this case was not only contrary to s. 450(2) C.C. but was also 
arbitrary and had infringed the accused's Charter right. 
8 See also Page 36 of Volume 38 of the publication -
R. v. LITHART 
R. v. BYERS 
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The accused had been properly advised of his right to counsel. He had phoned 
a lawyer who attended at the police station and consulted with the accused for 
a considerable length of time. After that, the accused gave the statement in 
issue here. In view of this, admitting the statement despite the infringement 
would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Statement admitted in evidence 
* * * * * 
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THE DEFINITION OF DEATH - MURDER 
Regina v. GREEN and HARRISON - Supreme Court of Canada -
Vernon - No. 18024, June 1988 
Two men were asked by the barkeeper to remove a passed-out drunk from the pub . 
They dragged him to the sidewalk and simultaneously let go of him. His head 
had hit the concrete like a ripe tomato. Agreeing that he possibly could have 
been hurt the two pro-tern bouncers left the drunk where he dropped. Someone 
else saw to it that the victim was taken to hospital where brain death was 
diagnosed as a consequence of the injuries sustained. The body functions were 
maintained by life support equipment until twelve hours later, after having 
removed the kidnies for transplant purposes, that support system was 
disconnected and the victim was allowed to die. The twosome was convicted of 
manslaughter and appealed their convictions to the Manitoba Court of Appeal.9 
The two accused argued that the doctors and not they caused the death of the 
victim. The injuries they caused were serious but had not resulted in the 
physical death of the victim. The event of death had occurred when the life 
support system was disconnected. The Manitoba Court of Appeal rejected the 
argwnents and was (to the best of my knowledge) the first superior court to 
hold that brain death is synonymous to death and that death is not an event 
anymore but a process. It follows that he who causes that process to commence 
causes death. 
Comptemporary medical technology is forcing society to come to grips with the 
modern concepts of death, from a legal, moral and medical viewpoint. New 
organ transplant procedures have proven successful and are now common place. 
At what stage of what is believed to be the process of death, are we allowed 
to terminate the life of one person to preserve that of another. I t does not 
require a genius to conclude that incredibly complex legal and moral questions 
may arise from this practice. 
In this Green and Harrison case the legal issue was different and more 
complex. In the Manitoba case the two bouncers were equally responsibe for 
inflicting the injuries that commenced the process of death. They clearly 
were equally responsible for causing the brain death as each on the count of 
three, so-to-speak, had deliberately let go of the limp drunk, full well 
knowing that his head would severely impact with the concrete sidewalk. In 
the B.C. case it became crucial when the event of death occurred. 
Homicide is causing the death of another person and murder is a culpable 
homicide. Harrison fired a shot into the head of a Mr. Frie. Subsequently, 
Green pwnped two bullets into Mr. Frie's head. The medical evidence was that 
all three shots caused damage to the brain stem and any, by itself would have 
caused the brain death of Mr. Frie. This meant that regardless which of the 
three wounds Harrison caused, by the time Green fired his sh.ots, Mr. Fire was 
already dead. Harrison had already caused the brain death of Mr. Frie and not 
9 Regina v. KITCHING and ADAMS (1976) 32 C.C.C. (2d) 159 
• I 
I 
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Green. The Crown argued that the traditional approach to determine the event 
of death should prevail, namely that death does not occur until "all vital 
functions of the human body have ceased to operate". The medical evidence 
disclosed that anyone of the three shots as well as all three combined would 
not have caused instant cessation of the function of the heart. It would have 
continued to function for at least three minutes. Evidence of arterial 
bleeding in each of the bullet tracks proved that the heart was functional 
when each of the bullets were fired in Frie's head. If the stopping of the 
body's most vital organ, the heart, is the occurrance of the event of death, 
then Mr. Frie was alive when shot by Green. 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal decision that brain death is synonymous with 
death received a lot of attention and following. The medical profession were 
very pleased with this common law definition of death and the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada recommended that Parliament define death by means of an 
enactment, that "irreversible cessation of brain function be determined by the 
prolonged absence of spontaneous circulatory and respiratory function" . 
Green's defence counsel urged that the jury would be instructed along the 
lines of the Manitoba decision (which was not binding on this trial judge). 
The Supreme Court Justice declined to do so. He held that the Manitoba Court 
of Appeal approach did suit the case before them in that cessation was the 
cruicial issue. In this case the crucial issue was the time of death. He 
observed that the Law Reform Commission and the medical profession had 
addressed themselves to the civil law concerns, such as sustaining life and 
transplant procedures. Their definition of death had disregarded the issues 
arising in criminal law, this case being a prime example of such 
unsuitability. The only way the Crown could prove to the jury that Green 
committed murder if the new definition was applied, would be to have the 
results of an EEG test after Harrison did his dirty work and before Green 
pumped his two bullets in Mr. Frie. 
The jury was given all the medical evidence and were told that the victim did 
not die until his hear ceased to function. 
***** 
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ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF THE COURT 
DEIAYING ALLEGATION AGAINST A PF.ACE OFFICER 
UNTIL HE HAS TESTIFIED IN A MA.TOR MURDER CASE 
Regina v. PUYPE - County Court of Caribou -
Prince George 14745, August 1988 
The ex-common-law wife of the accused Puype alleged that he disposed of 
"certain chattels" and then made an insurance claim for the loss of those 
chattels. He was charged in January of 1988 with fraud and public mischief in 
that he falsely caused a peace officer to enter upon an investigation. Crown 
Counsel was aware of the evidence, at least, in September of 1987. The 
accused is a police officer who was about to be a major witness in a murder 
trial. By memo from Regional Crown Counsel, the local prosecutor was advised 
to interview the ex-common-law wife and if she was found to be credible the 
charges should be preferred. He was advised to be prepared to defer any 
"action on our part" until the murder trial was concluded. The main witness 
against the accused was not interviewed until about two weeks after the murder 
trial was over and the charges were preferred some 14 weeks later. 
The accused moved for a judicial stay of proceedings. He claimed the Crown 
had abused the process of the Court. The Crown had simply put its decision 
whether or not to prosecute the accused, in abeyance to preserve his 
credibility for the murder trial. This had deprived the defence in the murder 
trial from discrediting a major Crown witness. 
The Crown argued that at the time of the murder trial they did not know that 
there was a complaint in which they could have confidence, against the 
accused. Therefore nothing of importance was withheld from defence counsel. 
Secondly, if the Court would find that the Crown had been wrong in the way 
they handled their dilemma then the misdeed did not call for the remedy of the 
judicial stay of proceedings. Thirdly, if a process was abused, it was not 
the one against the accused but the process in the murder case. 
The Court held that the delay was not deliberate to deceive the Court even 
though the accused's credibility was expected to be an issue in the murder 
case. At most it had been a careless failure on the part of the Regional 
Crown Counsel. The decision to delay the accused's case could affect the 
murder as well as the accused's trial. The carelessness had not amounted to a 
violation of "those fundamental principles of justice which underlie the 
community's sense of fair play and decency". It had not affected the 
proceedings against the accused and had only saved him an embarrassing cross-
examination during the murder trial. The accused in other words could hardly 
complain. If anyone has a complaint it is the person who was tried for 
murder. 
The accused was not entitled to a 
remedy. Application dismissed. 
* * * * * 
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DE'IKNTIOH - RIGHT TO COURSKL 
Regina v. HUITSLAND - County Court of Vancouver Island 
Nanaimo #3753 - July 1988 
At 6:45 hours a man was awakened by the noise of a motor vehicle accident . He 
ran to the window and saw a Corvette stuck in the middle of his lawn and 
pieces of the car scattered about the mailbox and near the house. The two 
occupants of the car fled and the resident did get a good look a the driver. 
Police obtained the R.O. of the car and went to his house. The accused 
answered the door in his undershorts but did not show any of the usual 
evidence of coming out of bed or from sleep. His hair, for instance, was not 
even ruffled. He smelled of alcohol and had scrapes and crusted blood about 
the face. He was told that his car had been involved in a single car accident 
and was requested to come to the scene. He did put on some clothes and 
complied with the request. He had volunteered that he had been home since 
2:30 hours. The police officers were obviously suspicious that the accused 
had been the driver of the car and were interested to see his reaction when he 
would see the heavy damage to his expensive car. 
At the scene the resident of the house was asked if he recognized the accused 
as the driver of the car. He made a very positive identification. Consequent 
to this and his emotion (or lack of it) indicating that he knew about the 
scene and the damage to his car an arrest or demand for a breath sample was 
made of the accused. The reasons for judgement do not indicate which, but the 
clearly states that from that point on the accused was detained. The defence 
submitted that the accused had been detained from the moment the police 
officers requested him to come along to the scene of the accident. 
The trial judge who convicted the accused for over "80 mlg." disagreed with 
the defence position. He had reasoned that no arrest can be effected until 
there is evidence to do so. The coming along to the scene was a cooperative 
gesture of the accused and until he was positively identified, "I don't see 
how he can possibly detain the accused.", held the trial judge . The accused 
appealed his conviction. 
The County Court judge who reviewed the case obviously disagreed with the 
trial judge. He saw no distinction between this situation and that involving 
a Mr. BonogofskilO who, for investigative purposes was asked to alight from 
his car and perform some sobriety test. "Regard must be had for the purpose 
of an officer in calling upon the driver to stop." In this case, then, regard 
must be had for the purpose for which the accused was requested and did 
accompany the officers to the accident scene. Repeating the words of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1985*, the County Court held that as a general rule 
it is not realistic that compliance with a direction from a police officer is 
truly voluntary in the sense that a person feels he has a choice to obey or 
not. 
10 R. v. BONOGOFSKI: Volume 29, page 1 of this publication. 
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The way the Court described the scenario at the accused' s home that had 
triggered the detention, was that the accused "was confronted by three police 
officers, told to dress and accompany them to the scene". The Court concluded 
that the accused was detained from the time of bein~ told to accompany the 
officers. Consequently the accused's rights were infringed and the evidence 
of identification and the blood/alcohol content resulted. If such evidence 
was admitted it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Appeal allowed . 
Conviction for "over 80 mlg" set aside 
Comment: In reviewing the evidence that was before the trial judge the County 
Court judge wrote that one officer had "asked" the accused to dress 
and accompany him to the scene. In deciding whether this asking had 
caused detention he wrote that the accused was "told" to dress and 
accompany. No further reference was made to this conversation that 
had caused the detention. 'When, in the Bonogofski case, the B.C. 
Court of Appeal used examples to show when a person would be 
detained when following the directions of a constable, it 
exclusively used examples of car drivers who are pulled over or do 
as they are directed to do. All scenarios where persons in the 
role of drivers, compelled by law to follow the directions of a 
peace officer. Of course, Bonogofski was not compelled to comply 
with the roadside sobriety test. 
In this case the police investigation was related to a traffic 
accident but the accused when asked to accompany the officers to the 
scene was not in the role of a driver who must comply with the 
directions of the officer. The fact that the investigation was 
related to driving was coincidental but not relevant to the fact in 
issue. It could have been any kind of scene with the police mandate 
to investigate. 'Whether a person is detained is not determined 
exclusively by what the prospective detainee believed at the time 
but depends on all relevant circumstances. If a store burned down 
during the night and police called at the home of the proprietor to 
notify him they no doubt, will be observant as arson is always a 
possibility. If they ask the proprietor to come along to take 
possession or secure certain property or to just see what has 
happened to his business, surely the ride to the scene alone will 
not cause detention. 
Except for the manner in which the accused was requested, asked, 
told, or ordered to accompany, there seems no distinction between 
the two scenarios. Despite the fact they had little or anything on 
the accused other than some inconsistencies in regards to his claim 
of having been in bed for a few hours, the officers may have 
considered the accused suspect as they may any registered owner in 
similar circumstances or the store owner in regards to the 
possibility that he has set fire to his own store to collect the 
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insurance. No police officer worth his salt would close the door on 
these possibilities and in a sense the individuals are suspects 
although he may and perhaps should not let that be obvious. 
Consequently, the binding precedents indicate that detention 
includes a person being in a situation where he or she is in need of 
legal advice; being in a predicament where the layman can but only 
guess what option, if any, is advisable to take or to discover what 
the option and rights are. This obviously is not the case with 
anyone police ask questions of in their investigation or give a ride 
to to take charge of or to view the damage done to their property. 
Police may well be speaking with a person they believe to be no more 
than a victim, bystander or witness who later turns out to be the 
perpetrator. Their initial utterances may well be important 
evidence when it is later discovered that they were false and 
intended to cover up their tracks or to divert any possible 
suspicion from themselves. One has to agree that the accused in 
this case, depending what information police had at the time, may 
have been in that category, but it seems hardly reasonable that our 
Courts suggest that every person accosted, approached, interviewed 
or Haskedff for information or to view something during an 
investigation must be told of their right to counsel ... just in case 
they later are discovered to be the culprit. 
It ·seems that it is important if the accused was given a direction 
to accompany with an implied ... or else, or was simply offered a ride 
to view the damage to his expensive car and take charge of his 
property. It is obvious that the trial judge when he held that 
without some evidence that made the accused a suspect and hence the 
so-called request a direction, there simply was no detention. 
* * * * * 
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LAVFOL ARD RF.ASOllABLE SF.AR.CH -
ACTIBG UPON Dm>RMATIOB OF COLLEAGUE 
Regina v. BING - County Court of Westminster -
X018808, New Westminster - April 1988 
The accused was known to police as the possible user of heroin and a police 
officer had received reliable information that a certain Mr. B was supplying 
him . This officer observed some kind of exchange take place between Mr. B and 
the accused right on the public street. This officer who had shared the 
information he had received with a colleague informed that colleague what he 
saw. The colleague searched the accused, found heroin and effected an arrest . 
The Provincial Court Judge acquitted the accused as the arresting officer had 
no more than the instructions of another officer. This did not give him the 
reasonable grounds to search under s. lO(l)(e) of the Narcotics Control Act. 
The trial judge held that consequently the search and seizure were 
unreasonable and had infringed the accused's right. He excluded the evidence 
under s. 24(2) of the Charter. The Crown appealed to the County Court and 
asked that the Court follow the precedent set by the Vancouver County Court 
in the unreported case of Regina v. Gordon in 1984. 
The County Court judge did follow the Gordon case and held that the officer 
who searched and arrested the accused had in the circumstances by 
"overwhelming implication" knowledge that the accused might have narcotics in 
his possession. 
To understand the reasoning in the Gordon case the following is a synopsis of 
it, as it appeared on pages' 25 and 26 of Volume 16 of this publication. 
Regina v. GORDON - Vancouver County Court, Vancouver Registry C.C. 
831503, March 1984 . 
Police gained surreptitious entry to a locked parking area of an 
apartment building. They then opened a locked car (previous visits were 
made to gain impressions of the lock) and searched it. A cache of what 
appeared to be cocaine was found in the trunk. The vehicle was placed 
under surveillance and the accused was arrested when he opened the trunk 
and handled the substance which in the meantime was analyzed and found to 
be cocaine. 
The accused was tried for possession for the purpose of trafficking. He 
raised the obvious defence in this case. He claimed that the search was 
unlawful and unreasonable. Therefore, the infringement of his right to 
be secure against unreasonable search should be remedied by the Court 
excluding the evidence of the cocaine. 
The defence subpoenaed the officer who had conducted the surreptitious 
search. He said he believed that what he did was lawful and in any 
event, he had been instructed to conduct the search by his superiors. He 
also expressed the opinion that no warrant could be issued for a parking 
lot or a car. 
I= 
I 
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The Crown, of course , relied on section 10 of the Narcotic Control Act 
which authorizes an officer to search any place, other than a dwelling 
house, if he reasonably believes that the narcotic is had or kept 
contrary to the Act. The Crown also relied on a comment made by the BC 
Court of Appealll that if section 10 is read to justify only reasonable 
searches, it is not in conflict with the Charter. The Crown also argued 
(and the Court agreed) that in this case the garage was not part of the 
dwelling house. 
Defence counsel raised the old, but interesting argument thats. lO(l)(a) 
N.C.A. is excessive and should be declared inoperable or invalid. This 
has been argued frequently and the Courts have held that the section is 
not as excessive as it appears to be on the surface. Grammatically, the 
section could be interpreted to say that a peace officer only needs to 
have "reasonable belief" to enter a dwelling house with a writ of 
assistance or a warrant, but can arbitrarily enter and search any other 
private or public place without any prerequisite beliefs or grounds. The 
Courts (with the exception of one Ontario District Courtl 2) have never 
believed that Parliament had any intentions to grant such sweeping and 
excessive powers to peace officers. Reasonable belief is requisite to 
all searches under that subsection the Judges said. This Court agreed 
with those views and held that the section is operable and valid and that 
the reasonableness of the search had to be weighed on the basis of the 
section. Defence counsel, of course, argued that even withs. lO(l)(a) 
in tact the search was unreasonable. 
The Crown had to prove the legality of the search. Then it is up to the 
accused to show on a balance of probabilities that the search was 
unreasonable and that acceptance of the evidence obtained thereby would 
bring the administration of justice into disreputel3 Just because a 
search is legal does not mean that it cannot be unreasonable while an 
illegal search is capable of being reasonable, held this County Court 
Judge. 
It was proved that the officer who conducted the surreptitious search had 
adequate reasonable grounds for believing that narcotics were illegally 
kept in the car. He gained those grounds from his supervisor who had 
told him of the evidence he and other investigators had of cocaine being 
stored in the trunk of that car*. Therefore, the search was lawful and 
the defence failed to show that the search was unreasonable and had 
infringed the accused ' s rights. 
11 R. v. COLLINS (1983), 33 C.R. (3d) 130. Also see page 1 , volume 12 of 
this publication. 
12 d R. v. RAO, not reporte . 
13 In October of 1984. (subsequent to this case) the Supreme Court of 
Canada held in Hunter v. Southam Inc. (Volume 18, page 12) that 
warrantless searches are ipso facto unreasonable unless the Crown 
shows otherwise . 
- 27 -
The County Court Judge concluded: 
"The conduct of the search was not shocking to the community. There 
was no flagrant abuse of power on the part of the police, nor was 
there a gross invasion of privacy. The police officer was acting in 
good faith and reasonably. Indeed, the exact opposite would be true 
- to exclude the evidence under the circumstances would be more 
likely to bring the administration of justice into disrepute." 
Evidence admitted. 
* * * * * 
~ -
I 
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ADMINISTER.ING ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE TO THE EXTENT THAT 
IT CAUSES DEA.DI - KANSLAUGllTEll ARD CRillINAL NEGLIGENCE 
Regina. v. JORDAN - BC Supreme Court -
Vancouver CC 880535, October 1988 
The accused asked a native Indian woman he met in a bar, to drink with him in 
a hotel room. He booked in giving his real name but an inaccurate address. 
His intent was to have sex with the woman and to get drunk with her. He is an 
alcoholic. 
At 0600 hours, the accused left the woman "stupidly drunk" in the hotel room. 
He went to his own room in a different hotel. Police received a call from the 
accused at 0740 hours that the lady "became deceased". The woman was found 
dead. An autopsy revealed an unbelievably high blood/alcohol content and the 
cause of death was "massive inhalation of gastric content due to alcohol 
poisoning". Consequently, the accused was charged with manslaughter. In his 
defence he contended that the deceased committed suicide. 
The accused did testify but had problems with his credibility. He had a 
lengthy criminal record and his recollection of events was "selective" in that 
he remembered all things favourable to him and drew a blank on matters adverse 
to his interest. He also got caught in an unexplained inconsistency. He said 
that the deceased was still alive when he left the room, but phone one hour 
and forty minutes later from his own room that she "became deceased". His 
testimony was apparently quite inadequate in explaining this. 
The Crown's evidence of similar facts showed that the accused was involved in 
six "drinking orgies" involving other native women over a period of six years . 
They all died of alcohol poisoning - at least their respective blood/alcohol 
levels were, extremely high. 
That of the deceased in this case was 910 ml. The others ranged from a low 
340 ml to 790 ml. This revelation had caused police to keep the accused under 
surveillance after the death that led to this manslaughter charge. In a 
period of six weeks he was seen to approach native Indian women. On four 
occasions the investigators had to step in and "rescue" those women before 
they also became the victims of alcohol poisoning. The investigators had 
listened at the hotel room doors and overheard the accused do nothing but 
encourage these women to "drink up", to pour it "down the hatch", "finish that 
drink" and promised them up to $75.00 if they would drink it all. This 
evidence was admitted to show his method of operation and that there was an 
intent on the part of the accused to commit manslaughter. 
The evidence of his methods was adduced for the trier of fact to draw the 
inference that he had acted similarly with the woman whose death he allegedly 
caused. What corroborated this theory were notes he made in his diary. He 
wrote that he searched for intoxicated women, using them sexually, and 
"priming" them with alcohol. 
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Manslaughter is homicide that is blameworthy or culpable . For the accused to 
have committed the homicide he must have caused the death of the woman. For 
that homicide to be manslaughter (to be a crime) it had to be blameworthy. 
The Crown's strategy in the case was to show that the accused was blameworthy 
in that giving of the excessive amount of alcohol to this woman was criminally 
negligent. To do this there had to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused had a wanton and reckless disregard for the life and safety of 
that woman or that the accused showed such disregard by omitting to do 
something that was by law his duty to do. Alcohol is a poison and at common 
lawl4 we have a duty to preserve human life by being cautious with the use of 
"dangerous things": 
"lt is the legal duty of every one who does any act, which 
without ordinary precautions is or may be dangerous to 
human life, to employ those precautions in doing it." 
says the precedent. 
The accused knew the danger of excessive consumption of alcohol. He had 
learned this, or ought to have discovered this. Six women drank themselves to 
death in his presence. 
The accused's claim that the woman committed suicide was raised by means of 
his testimony. He said that she was taking pills while she was drinking. 
This was rebutted by the pathologist's evidence. The exclusive cause of death 
was alcohol poisoning. 
Criminal negligence is a unique feature in criminal law. It is not a crime to 
be criminally negligent except where the law specifically provides for it to 
be a crime due to its consequences (death, injuries) or in specific activities 
(operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, or airplane). Furthermore, criminal 
negligence does not require a specific or general intent on the part of the 
actor. It is a crime of advertence and indifference. Advertence refers to 
heedfulness; knowing what you are doing .... but being indifferent to the 
consequences .... in general a "negative state of mind". The similar fact 
evidence may also be examined to see if it proves such a state of mind - such 
an indifference towards the Indian woman. 
The whole of the evidence, including the similar fact evidence, was 
overwhelming to show that the accused "preyed" on native Indian women for 
sexual gratification and "perverted satisfaction in watching them drink 
themselves into insensibility". He knew it could cause death and was 
indifferent whether it did when he fed the victim the alcohol. 
Accused was convicted of manslaughter 
14 R. v. COYNE (1958) 124 C.C.C. 176 
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OFFICERS TESTiliO:NY REVEALING DIFFERENT OPINIONS - RF.ASONABLE DOUBT 
Regina v. WISE - Court of Appeal -
Victoria CA V00718, October 1988 
A constable and an auxiliary constable encountered a driver who had been 
drinking. The constable made the suspect perform certain tests and on the 
basis of what he observed he made the demand for samples of breath. The 
accused had not been told of his rights to counsel before the sobriety test . 
The trial judge did not allow the evidence from the test in evidence.ls The 
constable testified that he had a strong suspicion that the accused was 
impaired but felt he did not have the grounds to make the demand until he saw 
the failing performance of the sobriety test. The auxiliary constable 
however, testified that the accused showed all the symptoms of impairment and 
that he observed them before and after he alighted from the car. 
The trial judge relied on the auxiliary constable's evidence and convicted the 
accused of impaired driving. Referring to the regular constable's 
investigative process the trial judge said: 
"The constable well meaning as he was, is a fellow who 
appeared to me .... who was trained to ask people to do 
tests and take breathalyzers, and because they are trained 
that way they rely on those tests and breathalyzer results 
in their dealing with so-called impaired drivers, and 
sometimes because of that they are not as observant at the 
scene as other people who just look at you and say, as the 
auxiliary constable did, "He was impaired"." 
The trial judge then held that the evidence of the auxiliary constable 
particularly and what the regular constable testified to about his observation 
of the accused's condition prior to the sobriety test, had proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused was impaired. 
The accused appealed his conviction. He argued that since everything that 
came as a result of the roadside sobriety test and the test itself were 
inadmissible, that left the regular constable's evidence as that of suspicion 
and doubt. In that regard the evidence of the two Crown witnesses was 
inconsistent with one another and creates a reasonable doubt of which the 
accused should have been the beneficiary. 
The BC Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's argument. It held that the 
inconsistency does not have to create doubt. If the trier of fact acts 
judicially and accepts the testimony of a witness as being the true state of 
facts, he/she may reach a verdict based on that acceptance. If evidence of a 
15 See R. v. BONOGOFSKI Volume 29, page 1 of this publication 
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less positive nature on those facts raises a doubt in the mind of a trier of 
fact, then of course, there is a doubt. If it does not, then the evidence 
may be proof of the facts it relates to. 
The Court of Appeal having reviewed the trial court's reasoning, held that the 
trial judge had simply accepted the auxiliary constable's testimony as proof 
of the facts related to the accused's condition. After due consideration the 
trial judge held that the constable's "suspicion only" evidence did not cause 
him to doubt the accuracy and credibility of the auxiliary constable's 
evidence. 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction for impaired driving upheld 
* * * * * 
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ARBITRARY DETENTION AND UNRF.ASONABLE SEARCH 
STQlPDIG VEllICLE UPON RF.QUEST OF INVESTIGATORS 
Regina v. CURSON and SISKA - County Court of Vancouver Island -
September 1988, Victoria Registry 42891 
A police officer had a reliable informer. His information had nearly always 
proven to be accurate. The informer gave the officer an address from which 
cocaine was regularly trafficked. The officer and his partner staked out the 
house and observed activities consistent with trafficking. Cars came and 
went short periods apart. A tow truck with two occupants also arrived and 
left after a very short exchange at the house. The officer requested by radio 
that a marked cruiser stop the truck and hold it until he arrived at the 
scene. The uniformed officers complied under the guise of a routine 
inspection of the vehicle and documents. The two occupants (the accused) were 
asked to step out of the truck. The conversation between the uniformed 
officers and the two accused was consistent with such an inspection. 
The investigating officers arrived on the scene shortly after and the accused 
were told there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe they were 
committing an offence related to cocaine and arrests of both accused were 
effected; the accused were transported to the police station and the tow truck 
was searched. 
The reasons for judgment are in relation to a voir dire and do not relate the 
charges against the accused. The judgment does not say if any drugs or 
narcotics were found, but the list of items that were seized included a video 
cassette recorder, a bag of jewellery, and camera equipment. But whatever the 
charge, the object of the voir dire was whether there had been an arbitrary 
detention of the accused and if their right not to be subjected to 
unreasonable search or seizure had been infringed. It should also be noted 
that even if no drugs were found, the officers obviously relied on the 
Narcotics Control Act's search provisions. 
The officer in charge of the team related to the Court his experience and how 
he had learned certain patterns of behaviour on the part of people involved 
with drugs. The conduct of the two occupants of the tow truck coupled with 
the reliable information he received had "raised an awareness or belief .... 
that the occupants had attended at the residence for the purpose of involving 
themselves with cocaine." The fact that no lights were switched on or off in 
the house during the extremely short visit and that he could not think of any 
reason for a tow truck to attend that hour of the night, gave him reason to 
take the action he did. 
Dealing with the question whether there had been an arbitrary detention of the 
two accused, the Court considered it an after though of the Crown to rely on 
the familiar provisions in the BC Motor Vehicle Act that drivers must stop and 
produce documents when requested to do so by a peace officer. The testimony 
of the officers had been complimentary candid and they frankly told the Court 
that their sole reason for stopping the truck was to discover if there were 
drugs being transported. Whatever the uniformed officers did after stopping 
the tow truck, it was no more than a strategem to wait for the investigators 
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to arrive. Be that as it may, the trial judge concluded that being pulled 
over does not constitute detention. The uniformed officers "had no grounds, 
no independent grounds on which to stop the tow truck". The trial judge 
seemed to reason that since they did not know why the truck was to be stopped 
they were not detaining the accused for purposes under the drug or narcotic 
laws. The uniformed officers asked the two accused to step out of the truck. 
Also this did not constitute detention held the Court. When the investigators 
arrived at the scene the two accused were arrested "for charges related to 
cocaine". Needless to say, this constituted detention. The Court held that 
the investigators had the necessary reasonable and probable grounds to effect 
the arrest and consequently there had not been any arbitrary detention. 
One of the uniformed officers had seen the video cassette recorder, the 
camera and the jewellery in the truck's cab when he asked one of the accused 
to alight. He had passed this on to the investigators who then searched the 
truck. Looking where the uniformed officer did, did not constitute a search 
said the court. The items were in "plain view". In terms of the "plain view 
doctrine" applying, the trial judge held: 
"So far as it is necessary for them (the items) to 
have been seen by the officer, for the Plain View 
Doctrine to have application, then I find that he 
did see them ..... there has not been an unreasonable 
search or seizure." 
Consequently, the Court found, for the purpose of the voir dire that there 
had been no infringement of the accused's right to not be arbitrarily detained 
or to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. 
Comment: The reasons for judgment were oral and sometimes difficult to 
follow. Because the issues are so crucial to police practices was 
an attempt made to write about them. The findings of the County 
Court judge are of course, binding on our provincial courts and deal 
with matters the police community has been anxious to have cleared 
up. It seems, in relation to the Plain View Doctrine that there is 
not anything unique. That stopping cars to detect crime and using 
the Motor Vehicle Act as a guise, does not camouflage the.true 
intent and cannot be relied upon to make police actions lawful, is 
also old hat. However, that there was no detention when the 
accused's where stopped and still not when asked to step out of the 
truck is in view of what the BC Court of Appeal had to say in 
Bonogofski16, somewhat surprising. That highest court in BC said 
that not everyone who gets pulled over by police is detained. It 
used the example of police stopping traffic to warn drivers of 
hazardous road conditions ahead as an exception to such detention. 
The Court stopped there and did not say if a person who gets pulled 
over for a traffic infraction is detained. Considering the Court 
using as an example such an innocuous reason for a "pull over" an 
16 R. v. BONOGOFSKI · Volume 29 page 1 of the publication . 
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inference to say that stopping for the purpose of collecting 
information or evidence to prosecute constitutes detention seems not 
unreasonable. The practical aspect of considering everyone detained 
who is stopped for a road check or for any traffic offence, is 
frightening and could effectively paralyse traffic enforcement. 
There are some formulas that would allow a middle road to be 
travelled. But those would be conjecture at this stage. However, 
to say that there was no detention until the arrests were effected 
in this Curson and Siska case seems inconsistent with cases where 
detention was found at much earlier stages in encounters with 
police. 
* * * * * 
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nm CHARTER.: KOilDFJl - CONFESSIONS -
AND RIGHTS - APPARENT FRUSTRATION 
Regina v. EVANS - BC Court of Appeal -
Vancouver CA 005498, December 1988 
The accused, a 21 year old man, was left with a mental deficiency from a motor 
vehicle accident when he was 9 years old and heavily scarred from being burned 
a couple of years later. Consequently he has a low I.Q.; is not attractive; 
and is mentally and physically disabled as the injuries also left him with an 
abnormal gait. His family life was not good and his aider brother is a person 
who has been in and out of jail for armed robbery and iike offences. His 
relationship and his perception of the potential of any kind of familial or 
sexual involvement with women was and is nil. He feels that women do no only 
want no part of him but hold him up to ridicule. 
In November of 1984 a woman, in her twenties, was stabbed to death in a home. 
A few months later a female real estate agent while holding an "open house", 
died a similar death. 
Police suspected the older brother (who was out on parole) to have committed 
the murders. It was also believed that the younger brother, the accused, 
could have some information to assist their investigation of the murders. 
There was evidence that the accused was doing some petty trafficking in 
marihuana. To accommodate the questioning of the accused in regard to what he 
knew of his brother and the murders, he was arrested for trafficking in 
marihuana. 
When the arrest was effected he was told of his rights and asked if he 
understood. He replied, "No". He was told that he was to come with the 
officers and was asked if he understood that. He said he did . There was no 
attempt made to explain his rights to him at that time. 
At the beginning of the first interview, the right to counsel was explained 
but the accused did not indicate to understand at the time. In cells he 
spoke to an undercover officer (cell mate) and expressed the hope that he 
would be allowed to talk to a lawyer as that would makes things, "Go a little 
better with me." He was questioned about the marihuana but refused to say 
anything. 
During a subsequent interview (a short time later) the accused confessed to 
both murders. He was asked if he wanted to speak to a lawyer and he made an 
unsuccessful attempt to contact one. After that confession he spoke again to 
the undercover officer in cells and told him that he had confessed to the 
murders. The officer said, "You confessed?" Upon an affirmative reply he 
asked, "Did you do it?" The accused said, "No" and said, " .... they would not 
give me a rest until I confessed." He also was on the telephone to his 
brother. The conversation was obviously recorded and was adduced in evidence 
by the Grown. The brother told the accused that he had talked too much. He 
also questioned the accused if he knew his rights and upon this question the 
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accused recited the typical nTV version" of the rights to counsel and to 
remain silent. Said the accused to his brother, "Oh yeah I know, I watch TV 
man, I know what is going on." 
A jury convicted the accused and he appealed to the BC Court of Appeal. The 
main grounds for appeal were the infringed rights of the accused to consult 
and retain counsel and that the subterfuge on the part of the police 
(arresting him for trafficking but questioning him on the murders) had 
deprived the accused of his Charter right to be informed of the reason for his 
arrest. 
The three Justices wrote separate reasons for judgement. One would allow the 
appeal and order a new trial on the issue of right to counsel. The other two 
Justices dismissed the appeal, agreeing with each other on the disposition of 
the appeal, but parting ways when it came to the comments one of them made 
about the Charter and its effects on criminal procedures. 
The confessions by the accused were a major portion of the Crown's case . 
Finding that the accused's rights were infringed, would, of course, jeopardize 
the admissibility of those statements. The Justices found that technically 
there was a first and second detention. The reason for the first (trafficking 
in marihuana) he was informed of, but the second (the murders) he was never 
told about until well after the crucial interviews. The BC Court of Appeal 
rejected this ground for appeal and held that kernel to the issue was whether 
the accused understood his rights at the time. If there was a breach of the 
accused's right to be informed of the reason for the arrest it was 
inconsequential. Suppressing the statements for such a breach would bring 
disrepute on the administration of justice said the Court by majority . 
There had also been considerable argument about the accused's mental capacity 
to understand the consequences of confessing. He was very much in need of 
legal advice and was not capable to waive his right to silence. The defence 
relied on the cases that have clearly indicated that the right to counsel is 
an adjunct to the right against self-incrimination. 
One Justice of the Court of Appeal commented on this and indicated strongly 
that such a link was not what the drafters of the Charter had in mind. She 
said the Courts have given this a mistaken and too broad an interpretation. 
Realizing that it was ntoo late" at this stage, she nonetheless gave her views 
on this point. The Charter rights of being informed of the reasons for arrest 
and to consult and retain counsel are a reiteration of the common law right to 
have that detention tested for propriety; to be delivered and released if it 
is not lawful by means of a writ of habeas corpus if necessary. The right to 
counsel is in conjunction with the right to know why you are detained. It is 
not a right to be advised on your strategy with the authorities. She 
consequently disagrees with the cases where statements were disallowed in 
evidence because the accused's right to counsel had been infringed. Such 
infringement had and cannot be the "manner" in which the statements were 
obtained (sees. 24(2) Charter). She held that the accused's right to counsel 
had been infringed prior to the taking of the first statement and, with 
apparent reluctance, conceded that the confessions were subject to exclusion 
if admitting them would bring disrepute on the administration of Justice . 
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The evidence obtained from the accused was not real but self-incriminating . 
According to the ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada17 such evidence, 
obtained subsequent to a denial of right to counsel, goes to the fairness of 
the trial and should be excluded. Despite those strong words, the Charter 
itself allows admission if no disrepute is thereby cast on the administration 
of justice . 
Apparently assuming that the Charter places obligations on all citizens and 
not just on the governments and those who join the government in its interests 
(sees. 32(1) Charter), the Justice held that the Charter does not only 
extend rights to persons accused of crime. The Charter guarantees the right 
to life (section 7), the accused deprived his victims of that right. Said the 
Justice, 
"Nothing can be done to give them back that right 
they have lost. But something can be done to 
prevent another young woman who has never done Evans 
any harm being killed by him without a fair trial." 
Fairness of the trial, she said, must be weighed against the victims' right to 
life. Before the Charter the accused's trial would have been fair. Now, 
because of the Charter provisions, it is unfair. By national community 
standards what could be more unfair than to let a self-confessed killer go 
free only to kill again. Seventy-five years ago he would have been hanged for 
these murders; twenty-five years ago his death sentence would have been 
commuted to life imprisonment; now, the same evidence leads to adjudicative 
unfairness acquittal and more killings. "Such a result would not be the act 
of a civilized, but an uncivilized society." concluded the Justice. 
The Justice finished her reasons for judgment with these comments: 
"Wesley Evans is a pathetic creature. His crimes 
are rooted in things over which in truth I suspect 
he has very little control. An authority higher 
than this or any Court may not consider him a 
sinner. But Society must be protected from those 
who are incapable of resisting the impulse to kill 
innocent strangers." 
Appeal dismissed 
Convictions of first degree murder 
upheld 
17 R v. Collins - Volume 27, page 1 of this publication. 
Note: 
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The other Justice who agreed that the appeal should be dismissed, 
opened his reasons for judgment by saying that he did not 
necessarily agree with the comments made about the Charter. Neither 
did the Justice who wrote the dissenting reasons for judgment. He 
would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. 
* * * * * 
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CONSTITUl'IONALITY OF FIRGERPR.INTIRG A PERSON 
CHAR.GED WITH, BUT NOT CONVICTED OF AN 
INDICTABLE OFFENCE - IDENTIFICATION OF CRDlIRALS A<:r 
The Queen v. BEARE and The Queen v. HIGGENS - Supreme Court of Canada 
20384, December 1988. 
Beare was charged with breaking, entering and theft and was served an 
Appearance Notice which besides ordering him to appear in Court on a certain 
date also compelled him to attend at the police station to be processed under 
the Identification of Criminals Act. Higgens was charged with defrauding 
someone of more than $200.00 and was served a summons with instructions 
similar to those given to Beare. Neither party attended as instructed for the 
fingerprinting and other signaletic information to be recorded. Both parties 
applied to the Saskatchewan Queen's Bench for relief from this legal 
obligation. ~ey claimed that the provisions for the taking of signaletic 
information prior to conviction is contrary to the principles of fundamental 
justice; is an unreasonable search; violates the presumption of innocence; 
constitutes arbitrary detention etc. Two Justices of Queen's Bench rejected 
the applications but the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal allowed Beare and 
Higgens' appeals. This Court held that the practice does relate to criminal 
activities and to be "processed" under the Identification of Criminals Act is 
to be treated like a criminal. This, for a person presumed to be innocent is 
a humiliating experience that refers to physical and mental integrity which is 
included in the concept of "life, liberty and security of the person". (s. 7 
Charter). This meant that in Saskatchewan, no signaletic information was to 
be taken under the Identification of Criminals Act until a person was 
convicted of an indictable offence. This decision was appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada with the Federal Attorney General, the Canadian Association of 
Chiefs of Police and four provinces joining the Attorney General of 
Saskatchewan in the submission that fingerprinting is an integral and 
invaluable part of criminal investigations and that the current laws are 
fundamentally not unfair. 
The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed how by construction of enactments "lawful 
custody" captures the situations Beare and Higgens found themselves in. A 
person who received an appearance notice or has been served a swnmons for the 
alleged commission of an indictable offence is for the purposes under the 
Identification of Criminals Act in lawful custody. The questions before the 
nation's highest court were: 
1. Is this law in view of our guaranteed rights excessive? 
2 . If this law is excessive is it demonstrably justified in our free 
and democratic society? 
One aspect of the laws in question that had added to its constitutional 
condemnation in Saskatchewan was the fact that each person charged is totally 
at the mercy and whim of a police person whether he shall be processed. The 
matter is totally discretionary and the law provides no guidance in that 
regard. An example of such guidance in a discretionary authority is that 
provided in the "powers of arrest" section of the Criminal Code . It provides 
~ 
I 
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for discretion where certain categories of offences are involved and states 
that no arrest shall be effected unless certain public interest issues 
prevail. In other words in terms of fingerprinting the law leaves us open to 
capricious treatment. Furthermore, there are no provisions that signaletic 
records be destroyed if a person is discharged. All these aspects had 
aggravated the apparent ignoring of the presumption that the person subject to 
all of this is innocent. Despite that innocence, the charged person must 
surrender himself to custody and that humiliating process or face criminal 
charges for failure to do so. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal had implied 
that only if Parliament would take the arbitrariness out of the process, or 
make the decision for a charged person to be processed a judicial one, would 
the legislation be capable of being within the boundaries of constitutional 
properties. 
The Supreme Court of Canada did address these issues but felt that since the 
fingerprints of Beare and Higgens were never taken the matter of disposing of 
the prints upon acquittal did not arise in the appeal. 
The Court then summed up the significant uses of fingerprint identification in 
our society, from being proof that a person was at the scene to exonerating 
him from any wrong doing and many other uses for the purpose of security, 
prevention of crime and precautions to identify children in case they go 
missing. 
With this as a prelude the Court considered whether the Identification of 
Criminals Act is inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice. The 
Court observed how in 1971 the Bail Reform Act was included in the Criminal 
Code to reduce the number of people who were unnecessarily arrested or after 
an arrest kept in custody. Appearance Notices, Promises to Appear and 
Recognizance were provided for to compel court appearances and the broad 
definition of "lawful custody" became part of this package. This so custody 
was not extended or invoked simply for obtaining the suspect's fingerprints. 
Though a good argument can be made that all of this law enacted in 1971 to 
prevent unnecessary custody now offends the constitution, the Supreme Court of 
Canada said of the right to security of the person, "It should be given a 
generous interpretation, but it is important not to overlook the actual 
purpose of the right in question". The Court immediately rejected as too 
broad and indefinite the notion that feeling demeaned or indignant on account 
of the identification process brings the matter within "the security of the 
person" right. The fact that a person must appear at a certain time and place 
or be criminally liable, is far more capable of violating the right than how a 
person may feel about it. 
Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that although persons subjected to this 
process are presumed to be innocent, there are reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe the committed an indictable offence. The presumption of innocence 
only gives that person they right to remain silent and have the Crown prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt what it alleged. Also, the Court seemed to find the 
personal impact of being fingerprinted to be exaggerated. Custodial 
fingerprinting is "innocuous" and was a justifiable at common law as far as 
back as 1933. Is that all changed now because of our Charter? Considering 
the wide acceptance by the Courts of this practice before there was 
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legislation on this point and the fact that nearly every Nation provides for 
the practice including those with stringent human rights law, the Supreme 
Court of Canada concluded that the procedure provided for in our statutes to 
obtain a suspect's fingerprints are not inconsistent with the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. 
Responding to the alleged arbitrariness of the process (because peace officers 
have discretion whether or not to take fingerprints, and that those officers 
should only be able to do so if they have shown a need for the taking of the 
prints) the Supreme Court of Canada reminded that the daily operation of law 
enforcement depends on the exercise of discretion. It would be totally 
impractical to do as the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal appears to suggest . 
The exercise of discretion in this, does not offend any Charter right 
concluded the Supreme Court of Canada. Should it be shown that the exercise 
of this discretion was done for improper or with arbitrary motives, the person 
can seek relief and remedy under s.24(1) of the Charter. Although it may be 
desirable to have a senior officer approve the investigating officer's 
decision to have the prints taken (as in the U.K.) it is not constitutionally 
mandated in Canada. 
In relation to the right to privacy and not to be subjected to unreasonable 
search the Supreme Court of Canada drew a distinction between a body search or 
a house search, and the taking of fingerprints. There is no penetration into 
the body and nothing is removed; neither is there any searching or probing. 
It is as it were, part of the arrest which is by far a more serious violation 
of one's privacy. 
For all those reasons the Court found that the process of taking fingerprints 
from a person charged but not yet convicted of that indictable offence does 
not offend our Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
* * * * * 
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REASONABLE SEARCH - SEARCH VITH WARRANT 
UNDER S.10 N.C. ACT 
Regina v. XOKESCH - BC Court of Appeal -
CA008483, December 1988 
Police had Kokesch's home under surveillance for four days consequent to 
information from police in another community that he was cultivating 
marihuana. This surveillance did not yield too much information and at 2000 
hours the officers took a closer look. They went down at 75 foot driveway 
right up to the house; they found the basement apparently sealed off and 
condensation on the inside of the windows. There was also a humming sound 
coming from that part of the house, and the smell of marihuana came from 
lowered vents. 
It was conceded by the officers that when they conducted this search it was 
based on suspicion. However, this search gave them the requisite reasonable 
and probable grounds for obtaining a search warrant. Upon execution of that 
warrant plenty of evidence was found of cultivating marihuana and Kokesch was 
charged accordingly and tried in County Court.18 
The trial judge had not allowed the evidence to be admitted as he deemed the 
search to be unreasonable. He held that in fact there had been two searches -
one to obtain the reasonable and probable grounds for the search warrant and 
the second when the warrant was executed. Consequently, Kokesch was 
acquitted. The Crown appealed this decision. The Crown claimed that though 
the officers said in testimony that they had no more than suspicion to conduct 
their first search, in law they had reasonable and probable grounds. 
Furthermore, they had perhaps searched near a dwelling house but not inside 
one. This meant that their search was lawful under s. lO(l)(a) Narcotics 
Control Act and there was nothing unreasonable about the search. Readings . 
lO(l)(a) of the Narcotics Control Act "in its ordinary grammatical sense" it 
clearly states that with reasonable and probable grounds for believing that 
something is, had or kept contrary to that Act a peace officer may search any 
place without warrant. For a dwelling house a warrant is needed. 
In 1984, the Ontario Court of Appeal heard a Crown's appeal in the case R. v. 
RAo.19 The trial judge had interpreted and suppressed the evidence of hashish 
found in Rao's office. The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the trial 
judge's view of the section in question. It looked at this section in the 
setting of contemporary law, particularly the Charter. It reasoned that if a 
place other than a dwelling house to be searched is one where an individual 
has reasonable expectation of privacy and if circumstances make the obtaining 
of a warrant not impracticable in that it would impede effective law 
enforcement, police must have a warrant to search. The right not to be 
subjected to an unreasonable search was very weighty in this decision. Also, 
our Supreme Court of Canada held that lawful warrantless searches are by there 
18 See Volume 30, page 31 
19 R. v. RAO (1984) 4 CR (3d) 1. 
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very nature unreasonable unless the Crown shows otherwise . 
The Crown reasoned that when the officers went to Kokesch's house they were 
not searching for narcotics under s. 10 N.C.A. but were merely seeking some 
justification for getting a search warrant. There was no search so what they 
did was not something against which Kokesch was constitutionally protected. 
Yhat they did amounted at most to a minimal intrusive practice. They had 
reason to suspect Kokesch was cultivating and trafficking marihuana and were 
from an investigation point of view backed against a wall. There were simply 
no investigative measures open to them. Their suspicions were more than 
substantiated when they trespassed on to Kokesch's property. 
The BC Court of Appeal agreed that the officers were only trespassers and not 
searchers when they entered Kokesch's property without warrant. He was 
suspected and was found to flout the laws and could as such, not expect 
privacy. Private interest had given away to public interest in effective law 
enforcement. Consequently, the evidence the officers collected to justify the 
warrant had perhaps been obtained by means of petty trespass but not through 
an infringement of Kokesch's Charter right to be secure against unreasonable 
search. The search with the warrant was not in any way flawed and was 
reasonable and even if the search was unreasonable the trial judge had not 
given adequate consideration to the common law of the exclusionary rule. Said 
the Supreme Court of Canada:20 "Real evidence that was obtained in a manner 
that violated the Charter will rarely operate unfairly for that reason alone." 
In other words the BC Court of Appeal seemed to say to the trial judge; "Even 
if you are right on the constitutional issue of this case, you are still 
wrong. " 
Note: 
Crown's Appeal Allowed 
New trial ordered 
Several cases in BC had been decided based on the reasoning of the 
trial judge in this Kokesch case. The Crown appealed all of them 
and new trials were ordered for each. 
Yhat is also of interest is that three other Justices of the BC 
Court of Appeal decided the Marceau case that in circumstances 
appears not to be distinct from the Kokesch case. Their reasons 
were handed down o~e month before those i n Kokesch - (see next 
page). 
* * * * * * 
20 COLLINS v. The Queen (1987) 33 C.C .C. (3d) 1 . .. Volume 27, page 1 of 
this publication. 
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Regina v. HARCEAII - BC Court of Appeal, CA 007595, 
Vancouver, November 1988 
The appellant Alain Marceau lived with his brother Claude in a townhouse. 
They were suspected of robberies and thefts and were kept under surveillance . 
A person, at one point in time, came out of the house and buried something in 
the back yard. That person was not believed to be the appellant Marceau. A 
couple of days later when no one was home police conducted a search of the 
back yard. A syringe was found in the garbage can and the buried object was a 
thermos bottle filled with a white power. A sample was retained and the 
thermos was put back. Armed with this information a search warrant was 
obtained. 'When the warrant was executed Claude Marceau flushed the toilet and 
emerged from the bathroom with a spoon. Claude's bedroom contained a quantity 
of the usual pariphanalia connected with trafficking. Alain Marceau had 
$4,000.00 in small bills on his person as well as plastic baggies. Besides 
this, there was an abundance of evidence in the house and in the appellant's 
car, ~fan active consumption and trafficking of drugs at this location. 
Two weeks after all this, the brother, Claude Marceau, committed suicide. He 
left a note to say he and he only was involved in the drug trade and that his 
brother Alain, the appellant, was innocent. 
The officer who had supervised the investigation testified at Alain Marceau's 
trial. He was asked if he had given any though to obtaining a search warrant 
instead of allowing the surreptitious search of the yard by the investigating 
officers. He said that he though none was required and that the search was 
based on "hunch, suspicion and hope". The officer seemed to have relied on s . 
10 Narcotics Control Act for authority to search the garden without warrant 
and conceded he did not have the necessary grounds to get a warrant. The BC 
Court of Appeal did not find any evidence in the trial transcript that the 
officers who actually carried the search, had grounds to search under s. 10 
N.C. Act. 
There were three grounds of appeal: 
1. Should the evidence of what was found as a result of the 
unreasonable search not have been excluded? 
2. Was the proof against the accused sufficient to convict him? 
3. Should the suicide note of Claude Marceau not have received greater 
weight than it did? 
The BC Court of Appeal held that from the evidence adduced it could have been 
concluded that the officer who carried out the search of the garden had the 
requisite belief for doing so. It was the supervisor's evidence that brought 
that belief in question and the trial court had accepted his evidence as fact . 
Regardless of that evidence reasonable and probable grounds were shown (it was 
for the Court to decide if there are sufficient grounds and not the 
supervisor) and a reasonable person would conclude from the information the 
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searching officer had, that a narcotic was present. This means that the 
search was reasonable. But even if it was not, in these circumstances it 
would be contrary to the interest of the administration of justice not to 
admit the evidence. As in the previous case (Kokesch) real evidence was found 
and admitting such evidence will rarely render a trial unfair. 
In regards to the sufficiency of evidence against the appellant. The Court of 
Appeal reasoned that the evidence showing that the appellant was in possess ion 
of the narcotic must be weighed against the evidence that he was not in 
possession of the narcotic. Reviewing all the evidence a reasonable trier of 
facts would be sure beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant possessed the 
forbidden substance. 
The suicide note had received sufficient consideration as well. The defence 
called it a dying declaration (which it not likely is). The trial judge had 
not analyzed the note as he ought to have done according to the appellant. 
The BC Court of Appeal held that the reasons for judgement indicated that the 
note received the attention i t should have. 
Appeal against conviction was 
dismissed 
***** 
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COMPETENCE AND COMPELLABILITY OF SPOUSE OF ACCUSED 
TO TESTIFY WHERE HE IS CHARGED WITH AR.SON 
Regina v. LATI/fER - County Court of Prince Rupert 
No 10382, September 1988 
The accused allegedly set fire to clothing that very likely would have caused 
his home to burn down. He was charged with arson. At his trial his wife was 
called by the Crown. The indictment did not allege that the alleged arson 
related to the "wife's person, her health or liberty". This meant that she 
was neither compellable nor competent to testify against her husband. This 
issue became the subject of a voir dire. 
The trial judge listened to the wife's evidence which revealed that she and 
the children were in the house when the fire was set. Smoke alerted her of 
the fire and she and her children did get out. The witness testified that she 
did not think at any time that she was in danger . 
A BC Court of Appeal decision in 197821 did set the precedent that where a 
person is charged with a crime and the allegation does not relate to the 
person, health or liberty of the spouse that does not mean that the spouse is 
not competent to testify. If that testimony shows that the accused's action 
which constituted the crime, had caused a threat to the person, health or 
liberty of the spouse, then it must be regarded that the testimony is within 
the exception as contained ins. 4(4) of the Canada Evidence Act. 
Despite the fact that the wife did not consider that she was in danger at the 
time, the Court nonetheless found that the substantial fire that resulted, was 
in fact a threat to the wife's person and health. Hence the wife was 
competent to testify. Based on an abundance of law on this point the Court 
held that where a witness is competent he/she is also compellable. 
The Crown also intended the wife to testify about relevant communications she 
had with the her husband, the accused. Accordingly to s. 4(3) of the Canada 
Evidence Act and at common law communications between man and wife are 
privileged to the extent that spouses are not compellable to disclose such 
communications. 
The Quebec Court of Appeal22 is of the opinion that if persons are competent 
and compellable they "may testify about all aspects of the case, subject only 
to the ordinary rules of evidence", despites. 4(3) of the Canada Evidence 
Act. 
However, the trial judge in this case, felt he did not need to decide that 
issue. He made a distinction between "conversation that goes to the 
circumstances surrounding the alleged offence" and "some sort of statement or 
21 R. v. SILLARS 12 C.R. 202 (1978) . 
22 R. v. ST. JEAN (1976) 34 C.R. 378 
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confession of culpability" one spouse may make to the other. For instance, if 
the charge is the attempted murder of the spouse/witness and the words the 
accused spoke while he made the attempt that would indicate the alleged intent 
(or disclaim such an intent), that communication is not intended to be 
privileged. In this case, the words spoken by the accused, the Crown 
intended to adduce through the wife's testimony was part of the circumstances 
of the alleged offence. 
Witness was held to be competent and 
compellable - She was permitted to 
relate the communication between her 
and the accused. 
* * * * * 
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ENTJlAPMENT - WAT IS IT? -
HOV MUST A CLAIK OF ENTRAPMENT BE 
DISPOSED OF DURIRG A TRIAL 
HACK v. The Queen23 - Supreme Court of Canada 
December, 1988. 
A Mr. M, (who police conceded was difficult to handle), was placed as an 
undercover agent under police handlers who investigated the accused, Mack. It 
was agreed that Mack would supply a quantity of cocaine to M for about 
$40,000. - per pound. When Mack delivered a 12 oz sample of the product he 
was arrested. 
Mack raised "entrapment" in his defence. He testified that he had been 
petrified of M. The persistence to deliver had been very intimidating and 
"No" was not accepted as an answer. Mack told how he was made to believe M 
belonged to a syndicate; he was shadowed; and at one time M took Mack into the 
woods, showed him a gun and commented how people could get lost in remote 
areas like these. 
The trial judge had held that Mack had a propensity for drug transactions and 
had not done anything he had not wanted to do. Profit and not fear had 
motivated him to do as M had insisted. The conviction that followed was 
upheld by the BC Court of Appeal. That Court concluded that entrapment is 
available as an aspect of the abuse of the process of the Court and may result 
in a judicial stay of proceedings. However, the burden of proof is on the 
accused to prove on the preponderance of evidence that the State's practices 
had been so outrageous and shocking that not stopping the proceedings against 
the accused would bring disrepute on the administration of justice. He had 
failed to do so. The Court of Appeal agreed with the findings of the trial 
judge and upheld Mack's conviction. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
Swnming up the kernel topics of this appeal the Supreme Court of Canada wrote 
in the Judgement's introduction: 
"The central issue in this appeal concerns the 
doctrine of entrapment. The parties in essence, ask 
the Court to outline its position on the conceptual 
basis for the application of the doctrine and the 
manner in which an entrapment claim should be dealt 
with by the Court." 
The Supreme Court of Canada made the following observation at the outset of 
its analysis of the issue of entrapment: 
23 See Volume 22, page 29 of the publication (BC Court of Appeal) 
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"If the struggle against crime is to be won, the 
ingenuity of criminals must be matched by that of 
the police; as crimes become more sophisticated so 
too must the methods employed to detect their 
commission." 
Particularly in consensual crimes (where the victim consents) such as 
gambling, prostitution or drug offences, where either participation, blackmail 
or extortion prevent reporting the crimes to police innovative methods to 
ferret out the crime and the offenders is essential in our free and democratic 
society. Also fraudulent scams go undetected by the victims. Consequently 
the common law recognizes, sanctions and protects informers, agents 
provocateur, undercover operations. Even instigating the commission of an 
offence to ensnare the perpetrators is permissible. 
The Court made it clear that the police has a considerable latitude to 
infiltrate entities and deceive the deceptors but may not do so to randomly 
test citizens level of resistance to profit from crime; to challenge their 
virtues to determine who would commit crime if an attractive proposition came 
along. Police and their agents only have that latitude if they act on a 
"reasonable suspicion" or a "bona fide inquiry". Secondly the Court drew 
attention to the crucial distinction between providing an opportunity for a 
person to commit a crime and police actually creating a crime so a person can 
be prosecuted. Quoting a classic definition by an American Judge, the Court 
said that an example of entrapment is: 
" .... the conception and planning of an offense by an 
officer, and his procurement of its commission by 
one who would not have perpetrated it except for the 
trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer . " 
Further on , again quoting from U. S . juris prudence, the Court said whether 
there is entrapment 
" .... a line must be drawn between the trap for the 
unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary 
criminal." 
Should police be allowed to buy contraband from itself through an intermediary 
and then jail the intermediary? That is strictly ferreting out those who are 
predisposed to commit crime if the profit is beyond their resistance to 
temptation. Should, instead, entrapment only be allowed to uncover ongoing 
criminal schemes? 
If Police conduct that ensnares a person in a criminal act is shocking, 
repulsive and beyond the scope of their duties, is the remedy then to free the 
equally guilty accused or should he stand convicted along with the police 
"applicable provisions" of the law that apply to their office? 
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Can the Courts withhold their processes for the prosecution of a person who 
did in fact offended a law enacted by a duly elected government and veto the 
State's decision to prosecute? Are the appointed officials (the judges) 
empowered to interfere in prosecutorial discretion or police strategies where 
there are no infringements of constitutional guarantees of rights or freedoms? 
If the Court establishes that to those who are predisposed to commit crime the 
defence of entrapment is not available does that not encourage inequality and 
prejudice in law enforcement practices? Furthermore, to determine 
predisposition an accused's criminal record would become relevant similar to 
showing "similar acts" by the Crown. Again inequality at trial would result 
as the defence of entrapment would be easier available to those who never got 
caught than to the possibly unsophisticated offender who has been convicted 
before. 
The reason why the Canadian Courts have never recognized entrapment as a 
substantive defence is that it does not create a reasonable doubt or violates 
any rights or freedoms and most certainly does not exonerate the offender. It 
simply is a circumstance of the crime. His act and intent render the accused 
punishable and the entrapment fails to excuse him or "contradict the obvious 
fact of his commission of the offence". We therefore don't excuse the 
entrapped person for committing the crime. Entrapment is simply a public 
policy consideration. The public does not expect the police to behave 
repulsively or shockingly, particularly where they are testing a persons 
resistance to temptation without being involved in a specific inquiry. The 
U.S. Supreme Court put it as follows: 
"The Court has an obligation, with the power derived 
from its inherent jurisdiction, to refuse to lend 
its processes and effectuate the enforcement of the 
law by 'lawless means or means that violate 
rationally vindicated standards of justice'." 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that "the doctrine of entrapment" must 
be recognized in Canada. Being cognizant of the competing social interest to 
repress criminal behaviour the Court gave the following reasons: 
Judicial acceptance of unacceptable conduct by investigatory and 
prosecutorial agencies would bring disrepute on the administration 
of justice; 
Authorities do not have unlimited power to intrude into our personal 
lives or to randomly test the virtue of individuals; 
Entrapment will cause criminal acts on the part of person who would 
otherwise not have committed the crime; 
Police should not conunit crimes or engage in unlawful activities 
solely to entrap others; 
To manufacture crime is an inappropriate use of police power; 
Authorities are inherently limited in their power to manipulate 
people and events for the purpose of attaining specific objectives 
or obtaining convictions. 
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In view of the competing social interest the Court emphasized that they had to 
strike a balance between it and the justice concepts. However, said the 
Court: 
" .... it must be stressed that the central issue is 
not the power of a court to discipline police or 
prosecutorial conduct but, as stated in Amato:24 
the evident of the improper invocation by the State 
of the Judicial process and its power." 
The Courts cannot become a party to the spectacle of a person being convicted 
of a crime which is the work of the State. The only way the court can dis-
associate itself from this impropriety is to withhold its processes from the 
prosecuting State by means of the Court's inherent power to stay the 
proceedings to prevent what otherwise would amount to the State's abuse of the 
process and powers of the Court. Although a guilty person may benefit from 
the Court's disapproval of prosecutorial discretion, the larger issue is "the 
maintenance of public confidence in the legal and judicial process". The 
application of the doctrine of entrapment is necessary to preserve the purity 
of the administration of justice and is no more than a coincidental and 
derivative benefit to the accused person. Consequently it cannot be 
considered a substantive defence. If it was, a stay of proceedings upon 
finding entrapment would amount to a pronouncement that the is accused legally 
innocent. Unless the police conduct is such that the defence of duress or 
"necessity" is available to the accused, entrapment cannot negate the criminal 
intent and the wrongful act on the part of the accused. 
The Supreme Court of Canada emphasized, that should a. trial court hold that an 
accused was entrapped the Crown must be able to appeal that decision. 
Consequently, for that purpose only, a judicial stay of proceedings is the 
equivalent to an acquittal. "Otherwise, the two concepts are not equated" 
said the Court. Once again reviewing numerous decisions on the defences of 
duress and necessity25 the Court concluded that entrapment was not likely to 
go as far as to make these defences available and that consequently 
entrapment does not relate to blameworthiness or culpability of the accused 
and is therefore (despite the submissions of Mack's counsel) not a substantive 
defence but rather an aspect of the abuse of the process of the Court. 
Furthermore, assume that a person was enticed and importuned to commit crime 
by someone other than the police (or other agents). If he could not withstand 
the temptation this entrapment would most certainly not be available to the 
accused. When entrapped by the police, the accused in unaware that the offer 
of profit (or whatever the advantage may be) is extended to him by 
investigating authorities. Nonetheless, regardless who makes the proposition 
the temptation is the same as is the intent and wrongful act if he goes 
24 R. v. AMATO (1979) 51 C.C.C. (2d) 401 
25 PERKA, NELSON, HINES, JOHNSON and the Queen. Volume 18, page 5 of 
this publication. Supreme Court of Canada, October 1984. 2CSR 232 
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through with it. Consequently how could one reason that entrapment by another 
criminal does not diminish the intent to be excused for committing the crime 
while if the temptation is held out by police it would have that effect. 
Needless to say, the criminal mind in both is the same. Again the conclusion 
is that, considering the objective of the Court to not make their processes 
available where the police and the prosecutors (not private individuals) have 
overstepped their ethical boundaries, entrapment cannot be a substantive 
defence. 
In theory this all sound very idealistic but .... 
" .... what is the appropriate method of determining 
whether police conduct has exceeded permissible 
limits such that allowing a trial to proceed would 
constitute an abuse of process?" 
Furthermore, should the test whether there was entrapment be an objective or a 
subjective one? If objective police conduct in isolation will determine if 
there was entrapment; if subjective the propensities and predispositions of 
the accused will be included in that deliberation. 
The Court rejected the suggestion that entrapment is where a hypothetical 
non-predisposed person would likely have been induced to commit the crime . 
Instead the Court concluded that to include predisposition of the accused in 
the test for entrapment is to permit unequal treatment. It is always 
possible, reasoned the Court, that a person notwithstanding his propensities, 
has been led by police conduct to commit a crime. Not wanting to ignore this 
possibility the Court said : 
"Obviously it is difficult to determine exactly what 
caused the accused's actions, but given that the 
focus is not the accused's state of mind but rather 
the conduct of the police. I think it is sufficient 
for the accused to demonstrate that viewed 
objectively. the police conduct is improper" 
(Emphasis is mine). 
If that is not so, then a predisposed person could never avail himself of the 
doctrine of entrapment regardless how outrageous the police conduct was. If 
we presume that a predisposed person will commit an offence when given the 
opportunity, then it logically follows that where police has to go beyond 
creating an opportunity to induce a person to commit an offence, he is likely 
not predisposed. Consequently the predisposition test (created by the U.S. 
Supreme Court) is fundamentally flawed, said the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada observed that the incidence of entrapment seems 
more likely for police conduct in the U.S. than in Canada. It doubts that, 
considering police conduct in Canada many allegations of this sort will occur. 
Then the Court gave some examples where police tactics would be bonafide and 
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malafides. If for instance, in a particular location certain criminal 
offences are committed, then, despite the fact that there are no suspects, 
police may create an opportunity for someone to commit that offence. Where 
there is reasonable suspicion to believe that known individuals are engaged in 
criminal conduct police are also entitled to provide opportunities for them to 
commit the offence(s) they are suspected of committing. However, where 
police would plant a wallet containing money and ample of identification of 
the owner in a public park in the hope someone will come along and take the 
money, they acted without any grounds, Their actions run the risk that 
otherwise law abiding citizens will commit a crime while police were not 
engaged in an investigation. Their action amounts in such circumstances to 
random virtue testing. 
Another example was reports of thefts of handbags at a bus terminal. 
Planting a handbag in an obvious location and charging the person who takes it 
would not amount to entrapment. 
There are situations where the past criminal conduct of a person cannot be 
ignored. By itself it cannot lead to reasonable suspicion. If it and other 
factors cause reasonable suspicion then police may provide an opportunity for 
that person to commit an offence provided there is a proportionate and 
rational connection between the crime he is suspected of and the one he is 
given an opportunity to commit. 
Examples : 
Police reasonably suspect a person of frequently possessing marihuana and 
give him an opportunity to import heroin into Canada ---- or a person 
reasonably suspected to be active in the drug trade and police provide 
him with the opportunity for him to steal a car. 
About reasonable suspicion, the Court said that a criminal record is no 
prerequisite but can be based on many factors. "Information" of 
criminal activity may lead to a reasonable suspicion, and is sufficient 
to provide an opportunity to commit an offence. 
Therefore, entrapment is : 
1. Authorities providing an opportunity to commit an offence to persons 
without reasonable suspicion or acting malafides; or 
2. Authorities who have a reasonable suspicion or are conducting a 
bonafide investigation and go beyond providing an opportunity "and 
induce the commission of an offence". 
To test if police conduct has gone beyond opportunity and has induced the 
commission of the offence, the Courts must consider if an average person "i.e. 
a person with both strength and weaknesses" would have been so induced if 
placed in the same position as the accused person. If the common response 
from the public would be in the affirmative "police have exceeded the bound of 
propriety". This test, of course, is vulnerable to the criticism that the 
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average person is as obscure as the reasonable man the law has always 
somewhere in the woodwork. What is tempting to the "lambs" among us is 
perhaps not even bait to "wolves". The Court responded that should these be 
persons with particular vulnerabilities it must be considered "whether the 
(police) conduct was likely to induce criminal conduct in those people who 
share the characteristic which appears to have been exploited by the police". 
That "wolves" will benefit from the "average person test" the court found not 
"particularly troublesome". The same comment can be made when the "wolves" 
among us benefit from infringements of Charter rights. 
"In the short term it may well be "better" for 
society to convict such persons, but it has always 
been held that in the long term it would undermine 
the system itself." 
said the Court. 
The Court went on to say that the "average person test" is not the exhaustive 
means to determine entrapment. Exploitation of known mental weaknesses or 
disabilities; appeals to persons' instincts, compassions, sympathies or 
friendships can all lead to the conclusion that there was entrapment. Some 
person (particularly those struggling to recover from additions) need 
protection and not abuse. Disproportionate police involvement may cause the 
role of the police to outdo the wrong doing of the person targeted. The Court 
hastened to add that it was: 
" .... not willing to lay down an absolute rule 
prohibiting the involvement of the State in illegal 
conduct." 
Furthermore, absent exceptional circumstances, existence of any threats made 
to individuals targeted by inducement techniques or any strategy that will 
cause a risk of potential harm to third parties are included in impermissible 
police actions. 
In the final paragraph, of the judgement's chapter entitled, "The Proper 
Approach", the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to create a "basket clause". It 
emphasized that its description of entrapment was not exhaustive and that in 
many cases something that is improper may vary. Understanding of criminal 
activity is imparative said the Court and permissibility of Police conduct 
will depend on the criminal situations under investigation or of which police 
have a reasonable suspicion. 
In summary The Supreme Court of Canada came up with the 10 Commandments of 
entrapment. Like the infallible 10 Commandments they are not exhaustive: 
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To determine whether police have employed means which go further than 
providing an opportunity, it is useful to consider any or all of the following 
factors: 
1. the types of crime investigated and the availability of other techniques 
for the police detection of its commission; 
2. whether an average person, with both strength and, weaknesses, in the 
position of the accused would be induced into the commission of crime; 
3. the persistence and number of attempts made by the police before the 
accused agreed to committing the offence; 
4. the type of inducement used by the police including deceit, fraud, 
trickery or reward; 
5. the timing of the police conduct, in particular if the police have 
instigated the offence or became involved in ongoing criminal activity; 
6. whether the police conduct involves an exploitation of human 
characteristics such as the emotions of compassion, sympathy and 
friendship; 
7. whether police have exploited a particular vulnerability of a person such 
as a mental disability or a substance addiction; 
8. the proportionality between the police involvement, as compared to that 
of the accused, including an assessment of the degree of harm caused or 
risked by the police, as compared to the accused, and the commission of 
any illegal acts by the police themselves. 
9. the existence of any threats, implied or expressed, made to the accused 
by the police or their agents; 
10. whether the police conduct is directed at undermining any constitutional 
values (such as legitimate exercises of freedom of thought, belief, 
opinion and association). 
Considering that entrapment is subject to an objective test, the issue is one 
of law and must be decided by a judge rather than a jury. If the Court is the 
master of its process it cannot be a jury decision whether or not its 
processes shall be withheld. 
Needless to say, if the method of entrapping someone is such that it infringes 
a Charter right, then the issue may well be one of exclusion of the evidence 
resulting from the entrapment. 
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Finally the issue of entrapment can only result in a stay of proceedings where 
the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused has committed 
the offence alleged. If there is a jury, it must render a verdict of guilty 
and then the trial judge must be decided if a stay of proceedings lies. This 
is to protect the accused's rights to an acquittal if the Crown cannot prove 
its case. When a verdict of guilty is returned the trial judge may stay the 
proceedings by refusing to register the conviction due to entrapment . 
Remember, entrapment does not effect the guilt or innocence of the accused. 
The onus to prove on the balance of probabilities that the police conduct is 
an abuse of the process on account of entrapment, is on the accused. It seems 
then that where an accused may lay a foundation for entrapment during his 
trial, the issue of entrapment will become subject to a separate trial after a 
finding of guilt. 
The Supreme Court of Canada repeated what it held in previous decisions that a 
judicial stay of proceedings only lies in the nclearest of casesn. Also, it 
emphasized that entrapment is a very serious allegation against the police or 
the State. Police does need the room to combat crime in society. 
In this Mack case, the issue of entrapment had been tested subjectively as the 
Courts included the accused's motives for profit. Had they tested it 
objectively, they "ought to have" come to the conclusion that the conduct of 
police amounted to entrapment. Consequently the Court 
allowed the appeal, set aside the 
conviction, ordered a new trial, and 
entered a stay of proceedings. 
****** 
SHOWHAN v . die Queen - Supreme Court of Canada 
December, 1988 
Showman's cause of appeal is also the issue of entrapment. The Supreme Court 
of Canada gave its reasons for judgement on the same day as they handed down 
the Mack decision. The case seems "convenient" to show the application of 
entrapment and demonstrate the leeway of police in curbing the social decease 
the drug trade amounts to. 
A Mr. K, a friend of Showman for some seven years, was caught committing a 
narcotics offence. Police received information from K and other sources that 
Showman was a supplier of narcotics. For "considerations" in relation to the 
narcotics charges against him, K would contact Showman to arrange for a sale 
of narcotics. K arranged for three separate transactions between Showman and 
a police undercover officer. 
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On March 15 , K introduced the police agent to Showman at the latter's home. 
Showman acknowledge "doing pounds for $1900.00" (marihuana). As this was too 
rich for the agent they met again on March 18, Showman sold the agent half an 
ounce of marihuana (no charge resulted from this transaction) on March 15. 
On March 18, Showman showed the agent three half pound blocks of marihuana. 
The agent purchased one of them and learned that Showman could and was willing 
to supply cocaine and had been doing so for years . 
On April 13, the agent contacted Showman. Consequently Showman took him two 
days later to the home of Mr. M. After the introduction Showman left and five 
pounds of marihuana was purchased from M (M was charged separately for this 
trafficking). 
Showman's version of the transactions differed from that of the agent's. He 
claimed that his friendship with K had been exploited to overcome his 
reluctance to traffick in narcotics and to entrap him in committing the 
offence. K. had phoned and said a friend with lots of money wanted to buy; 
Showman had declined to become involved. The next day K phoned again and said 
the friend wanted 15 pounds, "You are talking to the wrong man" Showman had 
replied, but did promise to "ask around". 
K phoned again and practically begged Showman to help him "just this once" and 
reminded Showman of all the profits to be made. The following two consecutive 
nights K phoned emphasizing that his friend was becoming impatient. Showman 
then had agreed to meet K's friend (the agent) to see if he was O.K. If so, 
testified Showman, he would introduce him to a supplier. 
The following day K phoned ~wice (according to Sho_wman) to see if the 
arrangement had been made. · Showman claims to have been reluctant again but 
had told K to phone him the next day. When K placed that call Showman had not 
done anything towards the arrangement and told K to phone back in an hour. 
When he did he had agreed to the March 15 meeting. In addition Showman 
testified he had never sold one narcotics to anyone before. The three half 
pound bags of marihuana (of which he sold to the agent making a profit of 
$250.00) had been supplied by M who gave him that quantity just in case "the 
guy will like it and take more". Showman told the Court that K's importuning 
and offer of profit had finally caused him to do as K, a good friend for many 
years, had asked him to do. He had the impression K was in trouble and wanted 
to help his friend. 
The Supreme Court of Canada responded to Showman's appeal as follows: 
The police had acted on reasonable suspicion and were fully entitled 
to provide Showman an opportunity to commit a related offence; 
Drug offences are difficult to detect and the use of informers and 
undercover agents ( like K) are common and necessary; 
There was no exploitation of a friendship as the use of the 
friendship was not "unduly exploitive" as the dignity of their 
relationship was not violated; 
NOTE: 
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The number of calls by K to Showman were over a short period of time 
and did not exceed the normal caution of any drug dealer to become 
involved in any offer of profit and opportunity; 
K's solicitation would not have induced an average person in 
Showman's situation to have committed the offence he was accused of; 
and 
Consequently police conduct had not gone beyond the limits "society 
deems proper" . 
Showman's appeal was dismissed 
Conviction for trafficking upheld. 
* * * * * 
These two synopses may due to its volume, not seem like such. 
However, the reasons for judgement in these two cases amounted to 
110 pages. 
We have gone from barely recognizing entrapment at all to it 
being a doctrine of law that will oblige the Courts to withhold 
their processes to remedy police and prosecutorial excessiveness. 
This seems a quantum change that should be understood to grasp 
the uniqueness of the procedures by which to determine if a 
person was by entrapment induced to commit the crime h e is 
accused of. 
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TID BITS 
IMPAIRED DRIVING AND ·ovER. 80 MLG" 
A Mr . Phillips was apprehended for impaired driving. By department policy his 
vehicle was towed from the scene. This caused a 15 minute wait for the tow 
truck. On the way to the station for the breath tests another impaired 
driver was encountered. Arresting that driver caused another 11 minute delay . 
The conviction for "over 80" was appealed by Mr. Phillips and ended up in the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. 
He argued that the delays in compliance with department policy had caused an 
unreasonable delay and his breath tests were not done "as soon as 
practicable." The Court of Appeal pointed out that this term does not mean 
as soon as possible. He also challenged the practical and the constitutional 
validity of the preswnption that the blood alcohol level at the time of an 
analysis within two hours of driving, is the same as that at the time of 
driving. He lost on both counts. In essence the Court held that the relevant 
law was not perfect but justified in a free and democratic society (s. 1. 
Charter). The Court also rejected submissions that the breathalyzer laws 
violate the Charter right to be presumed innocent. The 25 page reasons for 
judgement deal with the history of our laws in regard to drinking drivers; 
deals with the scientific aspects; reviews all constitutional aspects and 
compares our laws with comparable laws in other Nations. For those involved 
in this area of law enforcement, it is nearly a "must read" judgement . 
Regina v. PHII.l.IPS. 42 C.C.C. (3d) 150. 
·SEARCH, SEIZURE AND EXTENSION OF DETENTION OF Goons· 
Police seized by warrant a quantity of documents. After 90 days, the 
investigating officer applied for an extension to retain the documents for an 
additional nine months. The Justice of the Peace granted the application but 
ordered the officer to supply the owner of the documents with photocopies so 
he could continue to conduct his business. Apparently this was sensitive to 
the investigation and the officer appealed the decision. The Quebec Court o[ 
Appeal held that a Justice of the Peace has no authority to order photocopies 
to be issued. He can only grant or reject the application. Only a judge of n 
superior court can order copies to be made and returned (s. 446 (15) C.C.) . 
Furthermore, the challenge had been that the Attorney General and not the 
police should have been the applicant. Not so, said the Court. At the 
investigatory stage the police and not the Attorney General is a party to 
proceedings like these. 
FILION v. SAVARD 42 C.C.C. (3d) 182 
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRESUMP'.rION THAT OCCUPANT OF SF.AT ORDINARILY 
OCCUPIED BY THE DR.IVER, HAS CARE OR CORTROL OF TIIE VEHICLE 
The accused was convicted of "over 80" while having the care or control of a 
motor vehicle. He had been found in the driver's seat and he failed, on the 
balance of probabilities to show, that he had not entered the vehicle for the 
purpose of setting it in motion (s. 258 (1) (a) C.C. - previously 237 (1) (a) 
C.C.). The trial judge held that if it was not for this presumption he would 
have had a reasonable doubt that the accused had care or control of the car . 
The accused ended up in the Supreme Court of Canada appealing his conviction 
on the grounds that the presumption offended the Charter right to be presumed 
innocent. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that any presumption an accused 
must rebut, even where the trier of facts has a reasonable doubt, does violate 
the right to be presumed innocent. However, there is a rational connection 
between what may be presumed and the facts requisite to it. Furthermore the 
Court found that the presumption was demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society (s. 1 of the Charter). The presumption was inserted in our 
criminal law to resolve two shocking aspects of the law. On the one hand a 
conviction without any consideration for the (intoxicated) mental state of an 
accused is repugnant. On the other hand to see a person acquitted because of 
intoxication, of an offence that has intoxication as an essential element, is 
equally repugnant. The presumption is simply a response to a very pressing 
social problem. 
Regina v. VHYTE - 42 C.C.C . (3d) 97 
IS A CAR. BEING DRIVEN OB A PDBUC S'l"REET 
A PUBUC PIACE? 
Boy and girl met; he was in a car she was on the sidewalk. He asked her if 
she nis working" and having received an affirmative answer he asked her to get 
in the car. While driving along they discuss what sexual service she will 
provide for what price. As the Hboy" is a police officer she is charged with 
soliciting under S. 195.1 (1) C.C., but acquitted. The Provincial Court judge 
felt that a motor vehicle that is moving along the road is not included in the 
special provision in subsection (2) which states that a motor vehicle 
nlocated" in a public place is a public place. She felt that "located" 
implied a stationary car to which attention may be called or from which 
conversation may be overheard. The Crown successfully appealed the decision. 
The Vancouver County Court held that the interpretation applied by the trial 
judge was too narrow. The car was at all relevant times in a public place 
and that is where the transaction took place. 
Regina v. SKITH - Vancouver No. C.C.C. 871887 
September 1988 
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CORSTITDTIONALITY OF PUBLICATION .BAN 
IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES 
The accused was alleged to have sexually assaulted his own wife . She 
successfully applied for a publication ban under s. 442(3) C.C. (nows. 486(3) 
C.C.). This section stipulates that in sexual assault cases trial judges may 
order that the identity of the complainant not be disclosed in the press or 
broadcast and shall so order when the Crown or the complainant applies for it. 
The Canadian Newspapers Company challenged the validity of this provision on 
the basis of the constitutional assurance that there shall be a freedom of 
press. The Supreme Court of Canada saw nothing unconstitutional in the 
enactment providing for the ban, despite it limiting the freedom of the press. 
It protects complainants from unnecessary trauma, embarrassment and 
humiliation; it stifles complainants from coming forward and makes the 
administration of justice less effective etc. Consequently the restriction of 
the media's right to publish the identity of the victim is demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. This despite the fact that the 
ban is mandatory upon application and could provide comfort and convenience 
for those who complain to humiliate a person. 
The Queen v. The Canadian Newspapers C~mpany - September 1988 





